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Purposes: The main objective is to compare two methodologies proposed by FI for
approximating capital requirements for name concentration risk, by
examining how the methodologies’ resulting capital requirement diﬀer.
Another purpose is to map the large number of laws, regulations and
notations within the field, as well as sort out their interrelationships.
An additional purpose is to provide a derivation of FI’s proposed
IRB Approach, i.e. the Granularity Adjustment methodology, adding
to the existing derivation in the article
“Granularity Adjustment for Regulatory Capital Assessment” by
Gordy & Lütkebohmert (2013).
Methodology: The thesis is performed through a quantitative study of generated
realistic portfolios and of Ikano Bank’s leasing portfolio, where two
methodologies for approximating capital requirement for name
concentration risk are applied on the portfolios.
Theory: The Standardised Approach and an IRB Approach, i.e. the Granularity
Adjustment according to Michael Gordy and Eva Lütkebohmert,
proposed by FI.
Conclusion: The relationship between a portfolio’s large and small exposures in terms of
assigned PDi is of great importance for how the two methodologies’ resulting
capital requirements diﬀer.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Background
The core business of banks is to receive deposits and to provide various forms of credit,
e.g. loans (Swedish Banker’s Association, 2013:a). This implies that banks, like most
financial institutions, expose the business to risks through their own lending operations.
Since banks play an important and well-integrated role in society, by allocating capital
between lenders and borrowers, a consequence is that also society is exposed to risks at
the same time. The societal risk is a result of the major negative eﬀects on a bank’s
environment, following the default of a bank. This has led to considerable pressures
from society and, consequently, banking regulations have existed for a long time with the
aim to ensure that banks keep enough capital for the risks they are taking (Hull, 2012,
p. 257).
As a result of the recent years’ major global financial crises there has, however, been
an intensification in eﬀorts to strengthen the regulations. The previous regulations have
apparently been insuﬃcient and stricter unifying universal frameworks have been de-
veloped to reflect the growing global financial world that aﬀect society today. In these
stricter banking regulations emphasis is laid on tougher capital adequacy requirements.
(Sveriges Riksbank, 2011:b) Capital adequacy requirements involves requirements that a
certain amount of capital should be put aside in relation to the risks a bank is taking on.
This capital is known as regulatory capital and for this there is a legal minimum level.
(BCBS, 2006, p. 12) The capital adequacy requirement exists to secure that the bank
can live up to its commitments.
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, henceforth BCBS, is an international
organisation with the mandate to establish a majority of the standards for the supervision
of banks. BCBS’s overall objective is to improve the quality of banking regulations,
supervision and practices worldwide, while striving for an improved financial stability.
Furthermore, they have devised three major global unifying agreements, known as Basel
I, Basel II and Basel III. (Bank for International Settlements , 2013:a)
Current eligible Approaches for calculating the capital adequacy requirement of a bank
is conducted in accordance with what was published in the Basel II framework from
2007, with a marginal correction in the Basel III framework that partly came into force
in 2013. These new rules will be gradually implemented until 2019. (BCBS, 2011, p. 57,
60 & 69) The rules from the Basel agreements are normative, not binding, but most
countries have incorporated them into their national legislation. At EU level the frame-
work is incorporated into EU law through regulations and directives, thereby making the
framework binding for Swedish banks. (Sveriges Riksbank, 2011:a) Finansinspektionen
(henceforth called FI) is the regulatory body in Sweden that assess the financial health
of the financial market. Supervision conducted by FI ensures that the Basel regulations
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are complied with, and they can also issue their own provisions, regulations and general
guidelines for compliance. (Finansinspektionen, 2014:b) The Basel rules are structured
in the shape of three pillars. The section called Pillar 1 specifies the minimum regulatory
capital requirement for the risks of a financial institution. Pillar 2 indicates that for
these institutions there are requirements for internal supervision in order to prove that
the overall risk assessment is satisfactory (covering additional risks than those required
within Pillar 1). Finally, Pillar 3 covers the disclosure requirements for institutions.
(BCBS, 2006, p. 2)
The risks for which banks are exposed to, and thus should cover with regulatory capital,
are broken down into three types of risk; credit risks, market risks and operational
risks. (BCBS, 2006, p. 12). The thesis addressess the risk type of credit risk, and it
is for the thesis specially important to understand the diﬀerence between credit risk
and credit concentration risk as well as how they are related. Credit risk is defined as
the potential event that one of the bank’s borrowers or counterparties does not fulfill
its obligations in accordance with agreed terms. (BCBS, 1999, p. 1) This may result
from a drop in the counterparty’s credit rating or if the counterparty defaults, which in
worst case could mean that the bank’s claim from the other party becomes worthless.
Credit risk can also exist on a portfolio1 level, and is the summarised credit risk of
all individual exposures. Credit concentration risk, on the other hand, arise when the
credits in a portfolio have a skew distribution across diﬀerent segments. These credits
are typically referred to as exposures. The segments may for instance consist of certain
industries, regions or correspond to individual counterparties. (BCBS, 2006, p. 214)
In the regulatory framework Basel II it is stated that concentration risk2 in general is
arguably the single greatest cause of problems in banks, as it is diﬃcult to quantify the
risk that the concentration generates. (BCBS, 2006, p. 214) To further demonstrate its
importance, concentration risks in mortgage banks was one relevant cause of the most
recent financial crisis. (Hibbeln, 2010, p. v) Moreover, by taking a brief historical look
back, thirteen banking crises are analysed by the BCBS, where they concluded that nine
had been aﬀected by risk concentrations. This further indicates its importance for the
stability of the whole banking system. (Hibbeln, 2010, p. 1) Since lending is the main
activity of most banks, risk arising from credit concentration is often the most significant
concentration risk (BCBS, 2006, p. 214).
Risks arising from credits, credit risk, is treated under Pillar 1 of the Basel rules (BCBS,
2006, p. 12). The two Approaches devised by BCBS to calculate capital requirements
for credit risk are simplified based on some fundamental assumptions. The simplifica-
tion is conducted in order to, among other reasons, enable supervision from supervisory
authorities. The supervision requires a certain degree of standardisation, ease of use
and traceability. It is furthermore worth mentioning that the BCBS’s minimum capital
1Note that the term portfolio is aimed only to describe a bank’s credit portfolio, and this notation
will be applicable throughout the thesis.
2It is important for the thesis to distinguish concentration risk from credit concentration risk as credit
concentration risk is a subset of concentration risk.
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requirement for credit risk is expressed as a percentage of a bank’s risky assets. (BCBS,
2006, p. 12) For treating credit risk the two Approaches developed by the Basel Com-
mittee applies in Sweden. (Finansinspektionen, 2013:a, 9-11) There are guidelines from
FI that at least a Standardised Approach shall be followed for such management, which
is based on external credit ratings. Institutions may also seek permission from FI for an
internal ratings-based (IRB) Approach instead of using the Standardised Approach. This
permission gives banks some possibility to develop internal methodologies for estimating
credit risk, allowing for greater risk sensitivity and adaptation to the bank’s particular
circumstances. (BCBS, 2006, p. 4) In cases where a bank’s credit portfolio deviates from
what is stated in the fundamental assumptions, an additional management of the subse-
quent concentration risk that the portfolio generates is required. (Lütkebohmert, 2009,
p. 101) This add-on to the capital requirement for credit risk is managed under Pillar 2.
Within the second Pillar in the Basel rules it is described that institutions should perform
an Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process (ICAAP) (BCBS, 2006, p. 204) that
contains internal processes to identify, measure, monitor and control all risks (BCBS,
2006, p. 214, §773); including credit concentration risk. (BCBS, 2006, p. 204) Regarding
practical methodologies for the quantification of credit concentration risk within each of
the two Approaches, there are none specifically designed and proposed by the BCBS.
Nor is it clear how such methodologies should be implemented in a way that is consistent
with the Basel framework. (Hibbeln, 2010, p. 2)
Although no methodologies are provided by BCBS, however, guidance from FI on how
the credit concentration risk could be approximated within each Approach exists in Swe-
den, for Swedish banks and financial institutions. Thereby, they must at least follow a
given methodology within the Standardised Approach. In cases where a bank is autho-
rised by FI for an IRB Approach, there is however a possibility to independently devise
a methodology if not following one that is proposed. To further complicate things there
are diﬀerent types of credit concentration risks and it is only for name concentration risk3
that FI’s proposed methodologies within each Approach diﬀer. For name concentration
risk alone, FI propose a particular methodology within the IRB Approach for the banks
entrusted with the permission. This is called "Granularity Adjustment" or "GA" and is
the same methodology used by FI for assessing whether institutions, through their inter-
nal IRB Approach, conducts a reasonable assessment of capital adequacy requirement to
cover all the name concentration risk arising from their credits.
FI states that an institution’s credit-related concentration risks are only possible to quan-
tify approximately, i.e. a theoretical correct methodology does not exist. (Finansinspek-
tionen, 2009:c, p. 1) FI furthermore urges Swedish banks to devise internal methodologies
3Name concentration risk arise when the exposures of a portfolio are unequally distribution between
individual counterparties. Note that the term name concentration risk is aimed only to describe name
concentration within credits, i.e. name credit concentration risk. This notation will be applicable
throughout the thesis.
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for the approximation of name concentration risks, but still proposes a particular method-
ology within the IRB Approach. As this is the same methodology used by FI for assessing
the institutions, it implies a higher burden of proof should the banks pursue a diﬀerent
methodology. The proposed methodology, even though unintentionally, after all indicates
a certain ranking of all methodologies available withing the IRB Approach for Swedish
banks. At the same time it also indicates a ranking between the Approaches for banks
in Sweden. These underlying reasons raises an interest to compare how FI’s proposed
methodologies for approximating regulatory capital requirement for name concentration
risk within each Approach, i.e. within the Standardised Approach and within the IRB
Approach, diﬀer for portfolios with diﬀerent characteristics.
There exists at least two public studies that demonstrate the relationship between Gran-
ularity Adjustment’s resulting capital requirement and HHI4 for portfolios, but none of
how the Standardised Approach’s resulting capital requirement relates to HHI. A com-
parison between the resulting capital requirements for FI’s two proposed methodologies
do not publicly exist. Furthermore, there is no indication that the previous studies
take a third dimension into account, namely the distribution of PDi for the portfolios’
exposures. This is believed to be an interesting parameter that contributes to such a
comparison, in order to allow for further conclusions. Finally, performing such a com-
parison for portfolios with diﬀerent characteristics, including the third parameter, would
add to previous research. The comparison would also provide Swedish banks and institu-
tions with additional knowledge of the diﬀerences in resulting capital requirements when
applying FI’s two proposed methodologies on their portfolios. The purpose and research
question of this master thesis is thereby:
1.2 Purpose
The main objective is to compare the two methodologies proposed by FI for approximat-
ing capital requirements for name concentration risk, by examining how the methodolo-
gies’ resulting capital requirements diﬀer.
As the introductory text indicates, there is a large number of laws, regulations and
notations within the field. An overall, comprehensive but simplified compilation of these
is missing and such a compilation is considered essential for a complete understanding
of the comparison. Another purpose of this thesis is therefore to map those laws, regu-
lations and notations as well as sort out their interrelationships in the Empirical Input
section.
4HHI is a measure to specify concentration, similar to the measure FI uses in their methodology
within the Standardised Approach.
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An additional purpose is to provide a derivation of FI’s proposed IRB Approach, i.e.
the Granularity Adjustment methodology, adding to the existing derivation in the article
“Granularity Adjustment for Regulatory Capital Assessment” by Gordy & Lütkebohmert
(2013). This derivation is positioned in Appendix A.
1.3 Research Question
What patterns or features can be established when applying the Standardised Approach
and the proposed IRB Approach, i.e. a Granularity Adjustment, for name concentration
risk on a variety of portfolios with diverse characteristics?
1.4 Limitations
There exist many diﬀerent methodologies that strive to quantify the capital requirement
for name concentration risk. In accordance with the main objective, a limitation is that
only the two methodologies that FI is proposing will be compared. Thus, all other avail-
able methodologies are disregarded. This limitation falls out naturally as the aim is to
compare the methodologies proposed by the supervisory authority in Sweden, i.e. appli-
cable for Swedish banks.
In light of the fact that it is two proposed methodologies being compared, the same
assumptions made by the supervisory authority when applying the Granularity Adjust-
ment is also made in the conducted comparison. These assumptions mainly concerns
existing parameter estimations of two input parameters to the methodology as well as
dependency on one systematic risk factor. These assumptions are further explained in
Appendix A as well as in the original article by Gordy & Lütkebohmert (2007).
An additional limitation is that all possible portfolio combinations are not aimed to
be compared, but the strive is an adequate sample of portfolios to establish patterns or
features when conducting the comparison between the two methodologies. The amount of
portfolios compared is limited to 10 000, each with the size of 10 000 exposures. Further-
more, the comparison is conducted with two sets of axes that are insuﬃcient to describe
all the variations of a bank’s portfolio. Thereby it limits the conclusions possible to draw.
Reality-based data from one company, the case company Ikano Bank, is provided for
the authors. For this data the methodologies are applied and the results compared to a
variation of portfolios. The limitation to apply the methodologies on only one reality-
based portfolio results in restricted generalisability.
Finally, the thesis is performed during a period of 20 weeks in the spring of 2014, which
implies a limitation in time and scope.
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2 Method
In this chapter the quantitative approach and deductive method is presented mainly
theoretical. This presentation is followed by a review of the literature examined by the
authors within the field. The chapter furthermore includes a thorough description of
how the thesis is conducted. Finally, shortcomings of the method and the outline of the
thesis is explained.
2.1 Quantitative Approach
The thesis is performed through a quantitative approach, i.e. based on the assump-
tion of an objectively given and measurable reality. (Backman, 2009, p. 53) The followed
methodology is also distinctly of a quantitative nature. An explanation is thereby formu-
lated by statistical and quantifiable results from replicable trials. (Backman, 2009, p. 33)
From a more specific perspective, the quantitative approach implies that credit concen-
tration risk is assumed to be measurable and that statistical data allows for comparisons
between diﬀerent approximation methodologies for the resulting capital requirement.
However, it should be made clear that a quantitative approach not only implies that
the processing of numbers comprise a major part of a study. In fact, a quantitative re-
search strategy includes significantly more. (Bryman & Bell, 2013, p. 162) Furthermore,
measurements allow for explanations through achieving a certain degree of causality,
which often leads to a possibility to generalise and replicate. (Bryman & Bell, 2013,
p. 176-181)
2.2 Deductive Method
Furthermore, the thesis is conducted with a deductive method as the starting point
is conceptual formulations in the shape of regulations and proposals from supervisory
authorities. (Backman, 2009, p. 54) Thus, the proposed methodologies by FI can be
seen as mathematical theories that will be tested on a variety of portfolios with diverse
characteristics. The diﬀerent proposed methodologies will thereby be compared in order
to attain an answer to how they diﬀer, which is typical for a deductive method. (Bryman
& Bell, 2013, p. 31-32) The ambition is not to state whether one of the methodologies
quantifies credit concentration risk in a more satisfying way than the other. The ambition
is only to give an easily understandable explanation to how the results from the two
methodologies diﬀer, and if patterns or features can be established for a variety of diﬀerent
portfolios.
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2.3 Literature Review
Prior to, and during, the initiation of the actual research work presented in the thesis,
a significant portion of time was spent on taking note of existing documentation within
the selected field. This, to consult and imbibe the available knowledge, is commonly
conducted to create an overview of the previously collective knowledge within the field.
This overview, in turn, is required in order to formulate a meaningful research question.
(Backman, 2009, p. 28-29) Based on the following literature review, a historical per-
spective is obtained and the currently used and established methodologies are identified.
The literature review also provides insights regarding how terms and notations within
the field are defined, specified and used. More importantly, previous shortcomings in the
knowledge base are identified, and especially the absence of the comparison performed by
the authors in the thesis. Moreover, this is in line with the contribution that a literature
review should result in for a thesis. (Backman, 2009, p. 29 & 57)
The empirical, as well as the theoretical, basis of the thesis is retrieved from various
sources of literature, such as international frameworks, scientific articles and books on
the topic covered in the thesis. Overall, it is possible to make a distinction between legal
and regulatory documents on the one hand, and scientific articles and books on the other
hand. The articles and books dealt with are all forced to relate to the regulations.
Presented below is an overview of current knowledge within the field of approximating
the capital requirement for credit concentration risk. To present it in its proper and un-
derstandable context, certain parts of current knowledge concerning calculation of capital
requirements for credit risk is also accounted for. To clarify, emphasis of this literature
review is placed on describing current knowledge and not just reciting an overview of
the treated literature, which is in accordance with what is proposed by Backman (2009,
p. 73).
The authors’ coverage of the Basel agreements consists of several final regulatory docu-
ments as well as preparatory documents. All other literature, and thus knowledge within
the field, are forced to take these into account, i.e. adapt to and comply with the regula-
tory framework. This applies primarily within the field of calculating credit risk, as the
BCBS define the methodologies used. It also applies within the field of approximating
credit concentration risk, as an overarching guideline. The authors obtained knowledge of
credit concentration risk from BCBS’s “International convergence of capital measurement
and capital standards” (BCBS, 1998), “International convergence of capital measurement
and capital standards - A revised framework comprehensive version” (BCBS, 2006), “Basel
III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems” (BCBS,
2011), “Working Paper No. 15: Studies on credit risk concentration” (BCBS, 2006) and
the superseded consultative paper "The New Basel Capital Accord" (BCBS, 2001) to-
gether with its supporting documents, which were all published prior to the Basel II
Accord. Focus is placed on the sections covering credit concentration risk. As the Basel
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agreements are incorporated into EU law, the two documents currently in force are read
to obtain additional knowledge about how credit concentration risk could be managed.
These documents are “Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the european parliament and of
the council” and “Directive 2013/36/EU of the european parliament and of the council”.
Usually these legislations are jointly referred to as “CRD IV”. The consultancy report
“CRD IV: Single Rule Book for EU Banking Regulations” from KPMG as well as the
European Commission’s “CRD IV/CRR – Frequently Asked Questions” is also studied,
since they provide a description of the most recent changes and what the reason for these
additions are.
Furthermore, the EU legislations is incorporated into Swedish law through a number
of documents from Swedish legislative authorities, one of which is FI. As a supervisory
authority, FI holds the permission to propose certain methodologies for Swedish bank’s
approximation of credit concentration risk. These methodologies must of course be in
line with the regulations in the Basel agreements. With respect to the main objec-
tive of the thesis, it is these documents that contains the most significant and useful
knowledge. Several documents made available through FI is studied, and these include
memorandums, instructions, provisions as well as reports. Special attention is given to
the two memoranda on “Kreditrelaterade koncentrationsrisker”, i.e. dealing with credit-
related concentration risks, as well as the memorandum “Bedömning av kapitalbehov för
koncentrationsrisker” where the resulting capital requirements corresponding to certain
measurement values, according to FI, are determined.
Regarding approximation of capital requirement for name concentration risk, FI refers to
three scientific articles. These articles comprise parts of the knowledge within the field
of approximating capital requirement for name concentration risk. However, FI partic-
ularly propose that Swedish IRB approved banks should comply with one out of these
articles, named “Granularity adjustment for regulatory capital assessment” by Gordy &
Lütkebohmert (2013). FI also uses this methodology to verify whether the IRB ap-
proved institutions approximate their capital requirement for name concentration risk
adequately. Consequently, this article is thoroughly studied and it contains a compre-
hensive description with derivations of the original version of the proposed Approach of
quantifying capital requirement for name concentration risk according to FI. To further
summarise and integrate empirical research, the research synthesis is enhanced (Back-
man, 2009, p. 72) by covering additional literature, such as the books “Concentration
Risk in Credit Portfolios” by Eva Lütkebohmert, “Risk Management in Credit Portfo-
lios” by Martin Hibbeln and “Risk Management and Financial Institutions” by John C.
Hull. These books present and discuss methodologies for approximating capital require-
ment for credit concentration risk. Furthermore, a Master thesis by Björn Torell named
“Name Concentration Risk and Pillar 2 Compliance” covers the diﬃculties that banks
may encounter when the add-on from name concentration risk should be approximated.
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In the search for knowledge, it is however not possible to find a public comparison between
the methodology that Swedish IRB approved banks are suggested to comply with and
the Standardised Approach methodology that bigger Swedish non-IRB-approved banks
must comply with. In this search experts at FI are consulted, while tools such as google
scholar and the library databases Lovisa and LIBRIS also are used. However, two partic-
ularly interesting sources are found, each consisting of a previously conducted study that
demonstrates the relationship between the Granularity Adjustment’s resulting capital
requirement and HHI. This implies that they resemble the comparison conducted by the
authors. Interestingly, one of the studies carried out is based on data from the German
credit register, leading to realistic portfolios that are modified due to confidentiality. The
second interesting source is the article "Measuring Concentration Risk in Bank Credit
Portfolios Using Granularity adjustment: practical aspects" published by SEB in Lithua-
nia. It includes a similar study, based on data from an Eastern Europe bank. (Beivydas
et al, 2009, p. 55) However, a public comparison between FI’s two proposed method-
ologies’ resulting capital requirements, that also includes a third parameter, is missing
within the field.
2.4 Course of Action
The main target audience of the thesis is individuals with an interest, but limited knowl-
edge, within the field. The thesis therefore contains additional basic and detailed ex-
planations. However, a basic prior knowledge in mathematical statistics is assumed.
For further mathematical explanations, see Appendix B. Remaining stakeholders are re-
garded as a secondary target audience. These can therefore skip certain parts, such as
the simplified mapping of laws, regulations and notations. Furthermore, this secondary
target audience is regarded as for example people with prior knowledge at the financial
institutions that may be interested in the result. The ambition is to explain the course of
action so that it is possible to repeat by someone else under exactly identical conditions,
in accordance with what is highlighted by Backman (2009, p. 40).
To facilitate the reader’s understanding regarding the comparison between the two method-
ologies, i.e. FI’s Standardised Approach and their proposed IRB Approach, a Granularity
Adjustment, the empirical chapter thoroughly maps how the current Basel framework
are devised and what historical circumstances that underlies its existence. To give an
understanding of notations and applicability, the empirical chapter also describes the
first and second Pillar of the Basel framework. The latter is described in a more detailed
manner. With notations and recommended implementation from the Basel framework
in place, the incorporation of the Basel agreements in the EU is described.
Furthermore, the impact on Swedish banks today is described in order to create an
awareness of what underlies the guidelines from FI. The interrelationships within the
regulations is also explained in detail, prior to a presentation of the case company Ikano
Bank and its credit portfolio of interest. The presentation is intended to provide an
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improved understanding of where the empirical portfolio data origins from. All the com-
piled empirical input in section 3 Empirical Input consist of secondary data, which also
applies to the empirical data from Ikano. Additionally, the data from Ikano is of a quan-
titative nature.
The theory chapter deals with mathematical explanations of the two methodologies pro-
posed by FI, as well as describes the most common notations for approximating credit
risk. Basic mathematical theories necessary for understanding the two methodologies are
treated in Appendix B.
In performing the comparison between the two methodologies, a large amount of port-
folios with diﬀerent characteristics are generated. All of these generated portfolios are
varied for two parameters. Initially, however, a couple of example portfolios are presented
in order to provide an intuitive understanding of how the resulting capital requirement
is aﬀected when varying the portfolios. The starting point is a reference portfolio where
all exposures are considered homogeneous, i.e. identical in size. Subsequently, the con-
sequences of violating this assumption is illustrated.
After the presented example portfolios, the computational course of action for gener-
ating the 10 000 realistic portfolios is described. This is followed by describing the ap-
plication of the two methodologies for all generated portfolios. After explaining how the
resulting capital requirement for both methodologies is approximated for each portfolio,
the results are graphically illustrated in 3-dimensional graphs, more specifically scatter
plots. In the first resulting graph, all portfolios are illustrated with measured values of
the two variables being based on the entire portfolio, the first set of axes. Thereafter, in
the second resulting plot, the same portfolios are illustrated with measured values based
only on the 30 biggest exposures’ characteristic, the second set of axes. Due to the 3-
dimensional shape of the graphs, they are illustrated in four diﬀerent angles. The reason
that the resulting capital requirements are graphically illustrated in these two diﬀerent
3-dimensional graphs, is that diﬀerent conclusions can be drawn from each set of axes.
In order to somewhat validate that the generated portfolios are realistic, a case company
is included in the comparison of the methodologies. The resulting capital requirement of
the case company’s portfolio is positioned in relation to the generated realistic portfolios.
Thereby, Ikano Bank’s portfolio acts as a benchmark in whether the generated portfolios
results in reasonable values in the two set of axes. Thereafter, the graphical illustrations
are again presented, with the only diﬀerence that the two data points corresponding to
Ikano Bank’s portfolio is included.
The next step in the analysis is to graphically illustrate the diﬀerence in resulting cap-
ital requirement for the two methodologies, for each of the generated portfolios. This
also results in two additional graphs, but illustrates instead only the diﬀerence of the
two methodologies’ resulting capital requirement for each portfolio. The conclusions re-
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garding patterns and features on how the two methodologies relate to one another are
thereafter drawn. The presented conclusions are followed by a discussion regarding the
results and if the conclusions in the analysis are reliable and generalisable.
Finally, when generating portfolios and implementing the two methodologies a certain
computer software is used, i.e. the numerical computing environment Matlab. An excep-
tion is when calculating resulting capital requirements for Ikano Bank’s portfolio where
Microsoft Excel is used. Furthermore, Latex is used when generating the report.
2.5 Shortcomings of the Method
A shortcoming of the quantitative approach is, as adversaries argue, that measurement
processes often imply an artificial and somewhat untrue feeling of precision. (Bryman
& Bell, 2013, p. 182) However, the authors awareness of this for the conducted analysis
allows for it to be regarded as a non-substantial shortcoming. Furthermore, there are
also diﬃculties in how portfolios are generated, in the decision of which portfolios are
realistic and how this is underpinned.
The processing of data is conducted by Ikano Bank, prior to the handover of the leasing
portfolio. It aﬀects the approximation, since Ikano Bank marginally modifies the data
for secrecy reasons. Thus, the resulting capital requirement for their portfolio is most
likely aﬀected. A reliance on that the handed over data is realistic is necessary, i.e. that
it mimics their real portfolio without any large deviations.
2.6 Outline of the Thesis
The thesis will follow a linear outline, which is typical for research papers. It implies a
logical organisation of the thesis in accordance with the following sequence: introduc-
tion, description of the problem, research question, method, analysis, result, conclusion
and lastly discussion. (Backman, 2009, p. 67) The current chapter theoretically explains
quantitative approach and deductive method, while thereafter describing the review of
literature within the field, the steps for how the thesis is conducted and shortcomings
from using the quantitative approach. This chapter will be followed by 3 Empirical input,
which consist of an explanatory mapping of the laws and regulations currently in force
as well as the notations within the field, in order to give the target audience a chance to
better understand the conducted comparison.
In chapter 4, a short introduction of common notations for portfolio characteristics is
presented along with the theoretical explanations of FI’s two proposed methodologies.
In chapter 5, it is described how portfolios are generated, how the two methodologies are
applied to the portfolios and it is presented how the resulting capital requirements are
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graphically illustrated. In chapter 6, the actual diﬀerence between the two methodolo-
gies’ resulting capital requirements are illustrated for diﬀerent portfolios. In chapter 7
the authors’ major conclusions from the analysis and the results are presented. These are
mainly focused on the actual diﬀerence between the methodologies. Thus, they include
conclusions regarding observed patterns and features of the two compared methodologies.
In chapter 8 the main conclusion is presented along with the authors’ reasoning concern-
ing the generalisability, plausibility and reliability of the conducted comparison and its
observed results. In the latter chapter, suggestions for further research are also proposed.
Parts considered too fundamental for anyone who is somewhat familiar within the field
and holds a basic prior knowledge in mathematical statistics are added to Appendix B.
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3 Empirical Input
In order to attain an enhanced understanding regarding the field within which the com-
parison is conducted, this chapter presents an explanatory mapping of laws and regu-
lations as well as notations within the field. To provide a holistic picture the mapping
starts out with presenting the historical background and laws being developed, to finally
end up in the laws currently in force. New regulations modifies the previous, while the
approaches used usually are preserved. Therefore it is necessary to understand the his-
torical developments in order to understand the current regulatory environment (Hull,
2012, p. 257). Additionally, the mapping begins with what applies globally and there-
after treats what is specifically applicable for Swedish banks, being relevant due to the
comparison of FI’s two proposed methodologies.
3.1 History Behind Global Banking Regulations
Banking regulations have existed for a long time, with the purpose of ensuring that banks
keep enough capital for the risks they are taking. (Hull, 2012, p. 257) However, during
the last 10-20 years significantly stricter and unifying requirements have been devised.
(Hibbeln, 2010, p. 5) The reason for these emerging regulations are recent years’ major
global financial crises. The world is becoming more and more connected, resulting in
financial institutions and national markets being dependant on what happens in other
parts of the world. This phenomena further reinforces the fact that problems in one
bank rapidly spreads to other banks. Today, this domino eﬀect goes far beyond national
borders and poses a threat to the financial stability worldwide. Potentially, the eﬀect
can even lead to a collapse of the entire banking system. (Hibbeln, 2010, p. 5)
The major negative eﬀects on a bank’s environment is largely dependant on interbank
loans, i.e. the lending among banks, which can cause problems to spread onto other
banks. (Hibbeln, 2010, p. 59) After having occurred several times, the observed eﬀects
of financial crises are that the whole world economy is hit hard and the consequence is
a period of diﬃculty for the entire society. Only a few eludes the consequences, and the
victims range from private individuals to the largest multinational corporations. The
negative eﬀects, for example, consists of higher unemployment rates, fewer investments,
lower interest rates and dim future expectations.
Banks have always had a relevance for the entire economy, but due to the globalisa-
tion and further integration into society their relevance today is becoming enormous.
This leads to the “too big to fail” phenomenon. In order to clarify, this implies that
states acts as a “lender of last resort”, i.e. they hold an implicit obligation to save the
bank from default since the wake of it would hit the country’s economy just too hard.
(Hibbeln, 2010, p. 5) The support loans and rescue packages, from tax payers, that states
are forced to give to both banks and other countries are thus performed to prevent a com-
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plete collapse of the world as we know it, as observed in the wake after the most recent
crisis.
Based on the awareness of today’s global environment, it is not diﬃcult to explain why
there is a need for organisations that are responsible for maintaining global financial
stability. However, the world has not always looked like today and it is historically
quite recently that this type of organisations are founded. One of these established or-
ganisations today hold the mandate to devise, suggest and recommend global banking
regulations regarding capital requirements and the supervision of banks. An understand-
ing of this particular organisation is of great importance to the thesis, therefore its role
and purpose is described hereinafter.
3.1.1 The Role and Purpose of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
The BCBS was founded in 1974 and since holds the mandate to establish a majority of
the global standards for supervision of banks. BCBS’s overall purpose is to improve the
quality of banking regulations, supervision and practices worldwide, while striving for an
improved financial stability. (Bank for International Settlements , 2013:b) A subsidiary
purpose is also to close gaps in international supervisory coverage and thereby ensure
global convergence. BCBS ensures the local supervisory cooperation through regional
committees and oﬀers training in the field of prudential supervision. The global stan-
dards established by BCBS is normative for most national regulatory and supervisory
authorities. (Finansinspektionen, 2013:c)
The BCBS has devised three major global agreements that all led to international regu-
latory frameworks, known as the Basel I Accord, Basel II Accord and Basel III Accord
respectively. In the context of overall global banking regulations this frameworks, com-
monly referred to as the Basel agreements, is usually the first mentioned since it is one
of the most significant frameworks. The Basel Accords are all devised as a response to
financial crises or financial problems causing societal problems. Hereinafter, the crises
and problems underlying the Basel agreements will be briefly addressed, along with their
implications for banking regulations. Furthermore, consequences from the banking reg-
ulations will be touched upon.
3.1.2 Financial Crises And Problems as Well as Following Responses From
the BCBS
Regarding the financial crises and problems, especially three sequences of events made
the decision-makers come to realise that previous regulatory frameworks clearly were
inadequate; leading to stricter and tougher requirements.
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3.1.2.1 The Default of Herstatt Bank: Basel I
Back in 1974, a financial crisis occurred that was the very reason why BCBS even was
founded later that year. The default of the german Herstatt Bank lead to a financial crisis
that spread all the way across the Atlantic sea, aﬀecting several foreign banks including
a number of US banks. (Hibbeln, 2010, p. 6) At this time many countries had some sort
of bank regulations, but the definitions and levels of required capital varied from country
to country (Hull, 2012, p. 258). Many countries thus realised that they had to unite and
devise shared regulations to prevent history from repeating itself. Yet, even though the
founding of BCBS, it took 14 years of hard cooperative work before the first globally
unifying framework at last was established. (Hibbeln, 2010, p. 6) Consequently, the 1988
Basel Accord was published, also known as the Basel I Accord (Hull, 2012, p. 257). This
framework was the first time an attempt was made to set international risk-based stan-
dards for capital adequacy and two requirements were defined, both specifically treating
credit risk (Hull, 2012, p. 259). Furthermore, these international standards thereby led
to a major harmonisation of international banking regulations and a minimum capital
adequacy requirement for banks (Hibbeln, 2010, p. 6).
The system for approximating risks was, however, very simplistic in its design and exhib-
ited several shortcomings, such as the limited consideration of risk-sensitivity (Hibbeln,
2010, p. 6). Due to its weaknesses, it was therefore subject to much criticism. (Hull, 2012,
p. 259 & 268) As the approximation system was designed to be generally applicable, this
resulted in that the same capital requirements applied to all exposures; no matter their
credit rating nor the type of counterparty (Hibbeln, 2010, p. 6). But the mere fact that
the Basel I Accord induced banks to follow the same regulation, regarding the minimum
level of capital required to set aside, was a great progress (Hull, 2012, p. 259). Parts of
the proposed regulations was nevertheless left to interpretation, which lead to diﬀerences
in the incorporation of national regulatory authorities and national supervision.
3.1.2.2 Regulatory Capital Arbitrage And Competitive Inequality: Basel II
After some time it was recognised that many banks took advantage of shortcomings in the
Basel I Accord through so called “regulatory capital arbitrage”. (Hibbeln, 2010, p. 6) The
main reason that this became possible was that all loans to corporations were treated in
the same way, i.e. the credit rating was disregarded when calculating capital requirement
(Hull, 2012, p. 268). Banks thus had the possibility to bundle their low-risk assets in
asset backed securities and then sell them to investors. This type of transaction results
in excess free capital for almost the same degree of risk. Capital that moreover could
be invested in additional, risky projects. The risk-taking behaviour of banks was thus
not eﬀectively inhibited. (Hibbeln, 2010, p. 6-7) Furthermore, the increased globalisation
had resulted in a growing number of major banks establishing abroad and it became of
great importance to prevent injustice when banks increasingly began to compete with
15
each other on a global scale. (BCBS, 2006, p. 2) The reason was that some states in
fact incorporated the Basel I Accord through looser regulations, whereas some banks got
comparative advantages.
In order to put an end to the injustices and cover the gaps, a revision of the previous
regulations was drafted by BCBS to reflect the altered financial environment. (BCBS,
2006, p. 2) The first draft was published already in 1999, however, there were many
improvements and alterations needed to be done after identifying the financial problems
that emerged from the Basel I accord. The finalised agreement, known as the Basel II
Accord, was therefore not released until June 26 2004. (Hibbeln, 2010, p. 6) (Lütke-
bohmert, 2009, p. 31)
In the revised regulatory framework some key elements were retained but, as a revi-
sion implies, the majority of the elements were substituted or updated while at the same
time new elements were added (BCBS, 2006, p. 2, §5-6). This meant that most of Basel
I lost normative legal force, even if a few unaltered elements still remained in eﬀect
(BCBS, 2006, p. 5, §19). The revision consisted of significantly more advanced capital
adequacy regulations, and it sophistically incorporated risk-sensitivity (Hibbeln, 2010,
p. 5-6)(BCBS, 2006, p. 3, §10). It introduced a system to match diﬀerent exposures
with capital requirements corresponding to their specific risk. Additionally, it provided
a range of options for determining the capital requirement for risks to allow both banks
and supervisors to select the most appropriate Approaches for their operations and their
financial market infrastructure. (BCBS, 2006, p. 2, §7) The revised framework was also
based on three, so called, Pillars, introduced in order to simplify understanding as well
as treatment of various risks (BCBS, 2006, p. 2, §4)(Hull, 2012, p. 268). The overall
objective of the Basel II framework is to implement methodologies within each Approach
whose capital requirements complies more closely to the underlying risk, thus strength-
ening the financial stability and soundness of the international banking system (Hibbeln,
2010, p. 1). But also, as described, to address the competitive inequality among interna-
tionally active banks (BCBS, 2006, p. 2, §4).
3.1.2.3 The Financial Crisis 2007-2008: Basel III
As most of us remember, these new regulations were again inadequate to maintain global
financial stability. In 2007-2008, a severe financial crisis paralysed the world. Considered
by many top economists as the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression of the
1930s. (Reuters, 2009) One of the main reasons for the crisis was that the banking sector
had built up excessive on- and oﬀ-balance sheet leverage. (BCBS, 2011, p. 1) The event
that finally worsened the crisis and really started the domino-eﬀect was the default of
the American investment bank Lehman Brothers in 2008. At the time it was the fourth-
largest bank in the US, with debts and liabilities at 613 billion dollars, indicating the
magnitude of its significance. A main reason for the rapid spread of the crisis was the
diﬃculty for banks to assess the credit quality of other banks. There had in fact been a
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gradual erosion of the level and quality of the regulatory capital base. (BCBS, 2011, p. 1)
Shortcomings of the then current regulatory framework thus contributed to the domino-
eﬀect, and the BCBS came to realise that the framework needed to be complemented.
Fundamental reforms were drafted to address the various failures of the previous frame-
work, which were revealed by the crisis, and strengthen the global capital framework
(BCBS, 2011, p. 2). The result of this most recently devised framework was another
Basel agreement finally published in December 2010, the Basel III Accord. Its main
purpose is to inhibit the probability of financial bubbles, i.e. there should be fewer, and
make crises occur more scarce. Focus is put on improved liquidity, increased quantity
and quality of the regulatory capital as well as eﬀorts to take into account and reduce
cyclicality. (BCBS, 2011, p. 2-8) Briefly, it consists of capitals reforms and liquidity stan-
dards (KPMG, 2013, p. 1). The capital reforms is expressed as three extra capital buﬀers
during periods outside of stress to inhibit breaches of the minimum capital adequacy re-
quirement (BCBS, 2011, p. 6 & 54), whereas global liquidity standards are introduced to
improve the measurement of accessibility to regulatory capital (BCBS, 2011, p. 8). The
implementation of Basel III implies a huge eﬀect on banks, increasing their costs and
capital adequacy requirements (Swedish Banker’s Association, 2010) (Sveriges Riksbank,
2011:b), but will also inhibitory aﬀect the global economy. Interestingly, OECD predicts
that a medium-term yearly decrease of GDP of -0, 05% to  0, 15% will occur from the
implementation of the tough Basel III Accord alone. (Slovik & Cournede, 2011, p. 2)
The latest addition to the Basel agreements is yet another part of the Basel III Accord,
namely “Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools”,
published in January 2013. However, this part deals only with liquidity risk (BCBS,
2013, p. 1, §1) whereby it is not of relevance to the thesis.
3.1.3 The Basel Agreements Primarily Treats Capital Adequacy Require-
ments
The Basel agreements aim to address several issues, which at an overall level all are lead-
ing to a reasonable capital adequacy level for the risks a bank is exposed to (BCBS, 2006,
p. 1, §1). For the thesis it is of importance to fully understand the term capital adequacy
requirement and how it can be measured by the capital adequacy ratio. This term and
measure is explained in Appendix B.1, for those who find it unfamiliar. Furthermore, the
essential parts of the content in current global bank regulations with respect to capital
adequacy requirements for risks will be mapped in the subsequent section. The scope of
the thesis determines what is briefly mentioned as well as what is explained in a more
detailed manner.
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3.2 Today’s Global Bank Regulations Regarding Capital Adequacy Re-
quirements
The current regulatory framework of capital adequacy requirements for risks applies both
from the Basel II and Basel III Accords, i.e. the currently applicable Basel agreements.
As already mentioned, Basel II introduced the notion of three Pillars. These Pillars
remain valid today and are illustrated in Figure 1. In fact, the Basel III framework
builds on the three Pillars of the Basel II framework. (BCBS, 2011, p. 2) Large sections
of the first and second Pillars are highly relevant for the thesis and will thus be explained
and treated extensively. The third and last Pillar concerns the disclosure requirements
for institutions (BCBS, 2006, p. 2). Since it does not aﬀect the appointment of standards,
it will not be given any further treatment.
Figure 1: The current Basel agreements are based on the three so-called Pillars.
3.2.1 The First Pillar
The first Pillar, also referred to as Pillar 1, specifies the minimum capital requirement for
risks of financial institutions (BCBS, 2006, p. 2) and the minimum capital adequacy ratio
is set to 8% of risk-weighted assets (BCBS, 2006, p. 12). However, national authorities
are free to define higher levels of minimum capital in their specific states (BCBS, 2006,
p. 3). The risks are separated into three diverse risk types; credit risk, market risk and
operational risk. Each type of risk independently generates capital requirements, which
is then added to result in the total capital requirement under Pillar 1. (BCBS, 2006,
p. 12) This corresponds to a computational bottom-up approach, which is illustrated in
Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Total capital requirement in the first Pillar is equal to the sum of the capital
requirement that each of the three risk types generate, independently.
With the three types of risk presented, from now on only credit risk is treated due to
the scope of the thesis. The regulatory framework of capital requirements for credit risks
are, for the majority, contained in Basel II and can be found in Pillar 1 and partially
in Pillar 2. The Basel III Accord acts mainly supplementary for credit risk, but also in-
cludes marginal adjustments within the standards for calculating the regulatory capital
for credit risks. (BCBS, 2011, p. 30 & 39) A brief explanation of consequences from these
minor alterations will be treated in Appendix C.
The calculation methodologies for credit risk that are presented in Pillar 1 are simplified
based on fundamental assumptions, in order to enable a certain degree of generalisation
in terms of the implementation in banks. They need to be both easy to use and traceable.
Another reason for the simplification is for making it possible for supervisory authorities
to accomplish their supervision. For this purpose it is required that the methodologies are
standardised and descaled. The negative consequence is that this reduction of methodol-
ogy complexity leads to several limitations. To begin with, for approximating the capital
requirement for credit risk the portfolio is assumed to be perfectly fine grained, or in
other words perfectly diversified. (CEBS, 2010, p. 2)(Gordy & Lütkebohmert, 2013,
p. 34) Another assumption is that there is only a single systematic source of risk, i.e.
one risk factor. This is a consequence from basing formulas on the so-called Asymptotic
Single Risk Factor (ASRF) model developed by the BCBS. (Lütkebohmert, 2009, p. 31)
These reductions of methodology complexity was constructed to ensure that capital re-
quired for any risky exposure should not depend on the composition of the portfolio it
is added to. In other words, each exposure does not claim any additional diversification
eﬀect (Hibbeln, 2010, p. 38). This characteristic is known as portfolio invariance and
is regarded as necessary for achieving the generalised applicability, i.e. making compu-
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tations possible as well as easily manageable for all banks (Lütkebohmert, 2009, p. 32).
The notion of portfolio invariance further corresponds to a computational bottom-up
approach, illustrated in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Capital requirement for credit risk is the sum of the capital requirement for
each exposure, independently of the other exposures.
Calculations of capital requirement for credit risk for a single exposure depends only on
the characteristics of the exposure and its obligor, e.g. type of loan, default probabil-
ity and maturity. The identity of the counterparty is immaterial, i.e. the risk of two
exposures connected to the same counterparty can be calculated separately. (Gordy &
Lütkebohmert, 2007, p. 2) As a result of the assumptions of portfolio invariance and
a perfectly fine grained portfolio, approximations within Pillar 1 only accounts for sys-
tematic (undiversifiable) risk, and thereby ignores idiosyncratic (diversifiable) risk since
there should not be any in the assumed portfolio.
The current Basel agreements permit banks a choice between two Approaches for cal-
culating capital requirements for credit risk under Pillar 1. The first alternative, the
Standardised Approach, implies measuring credit risk with a standardised methodology,
which is supported by external credit assessments. The second alternative, known as the
Internal Ratings-based (IRB) Approach, is comprised of diﬀerent methodologies and is
subject to explicit approval of the bank’s supervisor. It allows banks to use their in-
ternal rating system for credit risk or to simply conduct a more advanced methodology.
(BCBS, 2006, p. 19) This enables banks to customise the approximations according to
their specific situation and circumstances, allowing for greater risk sensitivity. (BCBS,
2006, p. 4)
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3.2.1.1 The Standardised Approach for Credit Risk Under Pillar 1
The Standardised Approach involves a methodology where a reliance on external credit
assessments is significant (BCBS, 2006, p. 19). These ratings can only be collected from
an approved external credit assessment institution, abbreviated ECAI (BCBS, 2006,
p. 27). An example of such an approved ECAI is Standard & Poor’s, whose notation
for credit ratings is the one used as an example in the Basel II framework (BCBS, 2006,
p. 19).
In spite of its computational simplicity, the methodology is comprehensive to learn since
a categorisation of exposures is made between many diﬀerent types of counterparties. De-
pending on the type of counterparty, i.e. for instance a corporate, a bank or a sovereign,
the same credit rating may result in diﬀerent risk weights. The Approach therefore covers
a whole section in the Basel II Accord, in order to explain all categories and all specific
cases. (BCBS, 2006, p. 19-51)
3.2.1.2 The IRB Approach for Credit Risk Under Pillar 1
Although it is convenient to use external credit assessments, the negative aspect is that
they are not always completely reliable nor the most suitable with respect to each in-
stitution’s situation and unique portfolio. In order to give banks the opportunity to
approximate the credit risk capital requirement for a given exposure, in a way that is
more closely aligned with the bank’s particular circumstances, the IRB Approach is de-
signed as an alternative to the Standardised Approach. (BCBS, 2006, p. 52) But, as
mentioned, a bank needs supervisory approval before using the IRB Approach (BCBS,
2006, p. 52). The minimum requirements that a bank needs to fulfill in order to be eli-
gible for the IRB Approach are described in detail in the Basel II Accord (BCBS, 2006,
p. 88).
The IRB Approach is based on the existence of both expected loss (EL) and unex-
pected loss (UL). Without going into thorough details of the calculations, the result of
the mathematical functions is that they measure and return the capital requirement for
credit risk based on the UL portion. (BCBS, 2006, p. 52) Figure 4 illustrates the un-
derlying model for which the IRB Approach is based (Hull, 2012, p. 272). The reason
why the capital requirement for credit risk only corresponds to UL in this model is that
EL already is assumed to be covered by how financial institutions price their products
(Hull, 2012, p. 271). In order to attain capital required the risk measure Value at Risk
(VaR) is used, see B.12. The VaR is based on a one-year horizon and a 99.9% confidence
level. Furthermore, VaR is thus the total loss unlikely to be exceeded, i.e. calculated
so that the bank is 99.9% certain it will not be exceeded next year. For an intuitive
understanding it can also be seen as the worst-case scenario out of 1 000 years. (Hull,
2012, p. 272)
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Figure 4: The loss probability density function and the capital required for credit risk
by a financial institution.
Due to the above description and figure, the following notations are applicable:
VaR99.9%(L) = VaR99.9%(L)  EL+ EL
= UL+ EL
(1)
Within the IRB Approach, several risk components are approximated for every exposure
in a portfolio. These consist of probability of default (PD), loss given default (LGD),
exposure at default (EAD) and eﬀective maturity (M). (BCBS, 2006, p. 52) For fur-
ther explanation of these risk components, please see §285-325 in the Basel II Accord.
(BCBS, 2006, p. 67-76) Furthermore the BCBS has made available two broad methodolo-
gies, also referred to as Approaches, namely a foundation IRB (FIRB) and an advanced
IRB (AIRB). What distinguishes them from each other is that banks, as a general rule,
only provide their own estimates of PD for the FIRB Approach, while providing more of
their own estimates for all the risk components for the AIRB Approach. (BCBS, 2006,
p. 59) Apart from this deviation the methodologies are equivalent and they even use
identical formulas, referred to as the risk-weight functions, for deriving capital require-
ments (BCBS, 2006, p. 59). These formulas can be found in the Basel II Accord, for
the interested reader please see §271-284 (BCBS, 2006, p. 63-66). To finally clarify, all
these formulas hold only under the assumption of an asymptotically fine grained portfolio
(Beivydas et al, 2009, p. 46).
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3.2.2 The Second Pillar
Pillar 2 specifies the key principles of internal supervisory review to ensure that the over-
all banking risk assessment is satisfactory (BCBS, 2006, p. 2, 204). The second Pillar
therefore includes guidance to treatment of additional risks, as an add-on or supplement
to those risks required within Pillar 1 (BCBS, 2006, p. 204). The first key principle
simply states that there should be a process in order to assess overall capital adequacy
in relation to the risk profile of a bank (BCBS, 2006, p. 205). The management of each
bank is responsible for developing such an internal capital adequacy assessment process
(BCBS, 2006, p. 204, §721), which is often referred to with the abbreviation ICAAP.
Furthermore, the BCBS literally states that “All material risks faced by the bank should
be addressed in the capital assessment process. While the Committee recognises that
not all risks can be measured precisely, a process should be developed to estimate risks”.
(BCBS, 2006, p. 206, §732) The BCBS is obviously aware of the drawbacks associated
with simplifications in Pillar 1, and therefore Pillar 2 is instituted as a means to prevent
banks from actually disregarding the risks that are overlooked or neglected in Pillar 1.
Additionally, the assessment of compliance with the minimum capital requirements asso-
ciated with the methodologies in Pillar 1 is likewise an important aspect of Pillar 2. This
particularly applies for banks using one of the more advanced methodologies within the
IRB Approach. (BCBS, 2006, p. 204) The purpose of the second Pillar is to ensure that
banks hold adequate capital to support all the possible risks in the business, but also to
reassure a development and usage of improved risk management techniques. Emphasis is
given to the importance of a well functioning internal supervisory review process, and it
is made clear that extra regulatory capital is not regarded as a substitute for addressing
fundamentally inadequate control or risk management processes. (BCBS, 2006, p. 204)
Finally, there exists no proposed methodology for how this process should be performed,
only overall guidance is available in the Basel agreements (BCBS, 2006, p. 206-208).
There are three main areas of risks5 that are suggested as particularly suited for treat-
ment within the second Pillar, see Figure 5. The capital requirement from each of these
risk-areas therefore constitute a part of the total capital requirement under Pillar 2.
(BCBS, 2006, p. 204) One such area is stated as “risks considered under Pillar 1 that are
not fully captured by the Pillar 1 process”. The example set out for this type of risks
is credit concentration risk (BCBS, 2006, p. 204, §724), which is furthermore treated as
one of the specific issues that should be addressed under the supervisory review process.
It is specifically stated in the Basel II Accord that “banks should have in place eﬀective
internal policies, systems and controls to identify, measure, monitor, and control their
credit risk concentrations. Banks should explicitly consider the extent of their credit risk
concentrations in their assessment of capital adequacy under Pillar 2”. (BCBS, 2006,
p. 214)
5Note that this is not the three risk types of credit, market and operational risk.
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From now on, a distinction is made to only treat the credit concentration risk out of
all the material risks that should be managed according to Pillar 2 (BCBS, 2006, p. 206),
due to the scope of the thesis.
3.2.2.1 Credit Concentration Risk Under Pillar 2
The arising of credit concentration risk is a result of credits having a skew distribution
across diﬀerent segments. The segments may for instance consist of certain industries,
regions or correspond to individual counterparties. (BCBS, 2006, p. 214, §773)(Lütke-
bohmert, 2009, p. 65)
Credit concentration risk can more specifically be divided into three main types, i.e.
name concentration, sector concentration and credit contagion, see Figure 5 (Hibbeln,
2010, p. 57). Firstly, name concentration can occur either on an individual or on a
portfolio level. Individual name concentration risk arises when one individual counter-
party’s exposure is extremely large compared to the remaining exposures in the portfolio.
Portfolio name concentration, in turn, arises when a portfolio contains few firms, each
with large exposures. (Hibbeln, 2010, p. 58) Secondly, sector concentration in a portfolio
exists when groups of counterparties that correlates to each other because of common
underlying factors, e.g. same industry or geographical location, are associated with large
exposures (Hibbeln, 2010, p. 58). In the Basel agreements, the BCBS additionally di-
vides sector concentration into concentrations in the same geographic region as well as
in the same industry. (BCBS, 2006, p. 214, §773) It is important to understand how
these notations are related and the breakdown is illustrated in Figure 5. Lastly, credit
contagion refers to the increased dependence or correlation of two firms’ probability of
default, resulting from their shared business connections. Many banks also demonstrate
this joint dependence due to the large market of interbank loans, which is one of the un-
derlying reasons that financial crises can spread, already been touched upon. (Hibbeln,
2010, p. 59) Many scientific articles treats diﬀerent methodologies for quantifying name
concentration risk, while the other two concentration types are sparsely treated due to
the diﬃculties and burden in practically dividing individual exposures into their corre-
sponding sectors.
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Figure 5: Total capital requirement under Pillar 2 is based on several risks, where credit
concentration risk is considered as a significant risk.
According to assumptions of portfolio invariance and perfectly fine grained portfolios
in Pillar 1, the notion of credit concentration risk is not fully captured by the Pillar 1
process. As previously mentioned, the reduction of methodology complexity, i.e. the
bottom-up approach, leads to several limitations; one of which is just that credit con-
centration risk is not captured. (Lütkebohmert, 2009, p. 32) The risk-weight formulas in
Pillar 1 simply omits the contribution of undiversified idiosyncratic risk, which can be
seen as a residual, to required economic capital (Gordy & Lütkebohmert, 2013, p. 34).
However, such a residual of credit concentration risk exists in most real portfolios. This is
due to that these portfolios do not fulfill the assumptions, och thus the idiosyncratic risk
is not completely diversified (Lütkebohmert, 2009, p. 32). The only portfolios where the
asymptotic assumption might be approximately valid is for the absolute largest banks,
whereas the portfolios of smaller and more specialised institutions definitely contains
a residual (Gordy & Lütkebohmert, 2013, p. 34). Since most banks fail to fulfil this
asymptotic assumption due to their characteristics, regulations states that all but the
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very smallest banks are expected to account for this actual existence of concentration
risks under Pillar 2 (Lütkebohmert, 2009, p. 32).
Regarding credit concentration risk, all that the Basel agreements state is that banks
should have methodologies or processes that considers and approximates that risk. These
processes should also enable banks to identify potential weaknesses of their portfolios due
to the risk. (BCBS, 2006, p. 206) The credit concentration risk should therefore be mon-
itored and managed through these processes, but the BCBS does not, however, give any
concrete recommendations nor proposals on how such a process should or could be de-
signed. Finally, the most recently devised Basel III Accord includes minor alterations
for credit risk, implying indirect consequences for credit concentration risk. For the
interested reader these consequences are described in Appendix C.1.
3.3 Consequences for Swedish Banks
Furthermore, it is important for the thesis to understand how currently applicable global
bank regulations aﬀect Swedish banks, particularly the regulations concerning credit
concentration risk described above. Although these regulations are not binding, most
countries have incorporated them into their national legislation. Sweden is one of those
countries. However, being a member state of the European Union (EU) implies that the
incorporation into Swedish legislation as a first step passes through implementation at
EU level. This is the case for all EU member states, since the European Parliament in-
corporates the Basel agreements into legislation at EU level. (Sveriges Riksbank, 2011:a)
Subsequently, as a second step, the EU legislation is incorporated into Swedish legisla-
tion through application of the documents published by the European Parliament. These
provisions, consisting of complementary rules, are published by FI (Finansinspektionen,
2013:b, p. 1), being the responsible supervisory authority within the field in Sweden (Fi-
nansinspektionen, 2014:b). The relationship between legislative acts treating credit risk
and credit concentration risk on diﬀerent levels is illustrated in Figure 6.
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Figure 6: The legislative acts treating credit risk and credit concentration risk on diﬀerent
levels.
When incorporating at an European level, the goal is to adopt a regulation that estab-
lishes uniform rules, applicable in all Member States (European Commission, 2013:b,
p. 2, §11). After the addition of the Basel III Accord in 2010, the European Parliament
accordingly revised the EU regulatory framework. They then chose to implement it by
publishing both a regulation and a directive; a legislative package commonly referred to
as ‘CRD IV’. (KPMG, 2013, p. 1) The final legislative acts, the Capital Requirements
Regulation (CRR) and the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) (KPMG, 2013, p. 1),
was published on June 26 2013 (European Commission, 2013:b, p. 1). Together, they
currently form the legal framework on EU level (European Commission, 2013:b, p. 2, §5)
corresponding to the Basel II and III frameworks (European Commission, 2013:b, p. 5,
§41).
When one of the EU institutions agree on new EU laws, Swedish legislators together
with their opposites in other Member States are obliged to comply (EU-upplysningen,
2013). However, there is a certain diﬀerence between a regulation and a directive. Reg-
ulations apply directly in the form in which they are enacted, while directives only set
targets to be reached and therefore must be incorporated into national law before they
gain definite legal force. (EU-upplysningen, 2013)(European Commission, 2013:b, p. 6)
Before the implementation of ‘CRD IV’, the EU legislation consisted of two directives,
published in 2006. These were intended to implement the Basel II Accord, but due
to their legislative form they left room for certain diﬀerences when incorporated into
national legislation. (European Commission, 2013:b, p. 2) A consequence were slightly
diﬀerent computational methodologies in accordance to the national legal frameworks,
although based on the same calculation technique by BCBS. The injustices that arose
was one of the underlying reasons that a regulation was instead devised (European Com-
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mission, 2013:b, p. 6), with the aim to accomplish a “single rule book for banking reg-
ulation”. (KPMG, 2013, p. 1) Uniform rules applicable in all Member States of the EU
also strengthens the trust in the stability of the institutions, especially in times of crisis
(European Commission, 2013:b, p. 2)(Finansinspektionen, 2013:b, p. 21). The current
legislative package replaces the two previous directives (European Commission, 2013:b,
p. 5, §41) and currently applicable capital adequacy requirements for credit risk can be
found in the CRR (Finansinspektionen, 2013:b, p. 29), where it is treated in detailed and
prescriptive regulations (European Commission, 2013:b, p. 6). Thus, these current rules
removes the major source of national divergences (European Commission, 2013:b, p. 6)
and gains direct legal force for Swedish banks (Sveriges Riksbank, 2011:a). Concentration
risk, on the other hand, is briefly treated on a general level in both the regulations and
the directive (European Commission, 2013:a, p. 382, a81)(European Commission, 2013:b,
p. 6). It is stated that “having a large number of relatively small exposures should be
reflected in the requirements” (European Commission, 2013:b, p. 6, §43), but just as in
the Basel agreements there are no suggested methodologies for how to specifically treat
credit concentration risk (European Commission, 2013:a, p. 382, a81).
FI is the proprietor of the supervisory function in Sweden and is for example providing
general advice to Swedish financial institutions regarding their management and control
(Finansinspektionen, 2005, p. 1). In particular, FI performs the supervision of Swedish
banks’ and financial institutions’ credit risk assessments, which also includes the super-
vision of the ICAAP under Pillar 2. (Finansinspektionen, 2010)(Finansinspektionen,
2014:a)
3.3.1 FI’s Proposed Methodologies for Credit and Credit Concentration
Risk
Concerning Pillar 1, FI complements the CRR with provisions on prudential requirements
for credit institutions and investment firms (Finansinspektionen, 2013:b, p. 1). In this
respect they practically comply with the currently applicable Basel agreements described
in 3.2.1. Furthermore, FI performs a so-called SKB (Samlad kapitalbedömning; i.e. a
comprehensive capital assessment) for supervised institutions, where the supervision ac-
cording to law shall include large exposures and concentration risk (Finansinspektionen,
2009:c, p. 1). However, in terms of Pillar 2 FI diﬀer from Basel and EU to the extent
that they publish methodologies for credit concentration risks that Swedish banks could
choose between to follow in order to manage their risks under their ICAAP. There exists
methodologies within the Standardised Approach for the diﬀerent types of credit concen-
tration risks, as minimum requirements. It also exist proposed methodologies within the
IRB Approach. The proposals of the IRB Approach is done by expressing what specific
methodologies FI conducts for the approximation of credit concentration risks and for
assessing institutions, which thus can be seen as guidance from FI and an indication of
approved methodologies. (Finansinspektionen, 2009:a, p. 1)(Finansinspektionen, 2009:b,
p. 1)
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FI furthermore chooses to segment parts of credit concentration risks in their conducted
methodologies, namely into name concentration, regional concentration and industry
concentration. (Finansinspektionen, 2009:b, p. 1) In other words a proposed computa-
tional methodology for credit contagion is omitted, although it still needs to be taken
into account since a segmentation of parts of the risks provides space to take into account
more than the three segments. Moreover, FI propose methodologies both for banks using
the Standardised Approach as well as for IRB approved banks using an IRB Approach6.
The banks or banking groups that used an internal model for credit risk at the end of
2013 are Handelsbanken, Nordea, SEB, Swedbank, Svensk Exportkredit, Landshypotek,
Länsförsäkringar Bank, Volvo Finans and SBAB. (Finansinspektionen, 2013:a, p. 4) Ow-
ing to the proposed methodologies within the two Approaches, the only computational
diﬀerence between the Approaches is for name concentration risk, as illustrated in Figure
7 (Finansinspektionen, 2009:c, p. 2-5). Thus, the two proposed methodologies for name
concentration risk receives additional focus, i.e. one methodology within each Approach.
Figure 7: The methodologies within the two Approaches proposed by FI implies that the
Approaches only diﬀer for the two proposed methodologies for name concentration risk.
6To clarify, it is the IRB authorisation valid for credit risk which applies to credit concentration risk
as well.
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3.3.1.1 FI’s Methodologies for Name Concentration Risk
Regarding the capital requirement for name concentrations, FI proposes one method-
ology within each Approach. Furthermore, institutions must at least comply with the
Standardised Approach. It is for both methodologies important to be able to aggregate
all exposures to a single counterparty. (Finansinspektionen, 2009:a, p. 4)(Finansinspek-
tionen, 2009:b, p. 4) The methodology in line with the Standardised Approach includes
the use of a Share Adjusted Herfindahl index (AHI), resulting in simplified approxima-
tions. For a mathematical explanation please see section 4.2 (Finansinspektionen, 2009:a,
p. 4-5). The methodology is computationally very simple and is a minimum requirement
for banks as long as they are not very small, implying that they are not covered by FI’s
requirement and thus allowed to disregard name concentration risk (Finansinspektionen,
2009:a, p. 1).
For financial institutions authorised to use the IRB Approach, FI propose a specific
methodology that institutions should use for name concentrations. FI thus refers to the
article “Granularity Adjustment for Basel II” and presents a simplified analytical expres-
sion with a brief description. (Finansinspektionen, 2009:b, p. 4-5) The referenced article
is written by Michael Gordy and Eva Lütkebohmert in 2007 and in this article they
present the more advanced and detailed methodology that FI actually propose, which
is based on the risk model CreditRisk+ (Gordy & Lütkebohmert, 2007). This proposed
methodology for IRB approved banks is described in section 4.3 and derived in Appendix
A.1. Generally, the methodology known as Granularity Adjustment can be used to assess
the impact of undiversified idiosyncratic risk on portfolio capital requirements (Gordy &
Lütkebohmert, 2013, p. 34). In this manner, the methodology can be used to quantify the
additional risk from name concentration. An important aspect being emphasised is that
when measuring the granularity adjustment borrower identity can not be ignored, i.e. all
exposures to the same counterparty must be aggregated. (Gordy & Lütkebohmert, 2007,
p. 2)
FI furthermore states that the retail portfolio currently can be excluded when IRB banks
implement the granularity adjustment, since there is no significant concentration risk in
the retail portfolio (Finansinspektionen, 2009:b, p. 4). This implies that they do not see
the need to account for exposures towards private customers, but instead only account
for exposures towards counterparties consisting of institutions and companies (Finansin-
spektionen, 2009:c, p. 4). FI’s statement of excluding the retail portfolio is in line with
a proposal that was once published by the BCBS, in a consultative paper later being
superseded (BCBS, 2001, p. 90,§427). A brief explanation to why BCBS even made a
statement on this in such a previous stage is that a granularity adjustment at first was
considered for inclusion in the formal minimum capital requirement of the Basel II Ac-
cord, but then removed in the finally published Basel II Accord (Gordy & Lütkebohmert,
2013, p. 37). BCBS’s reasoning was that the retail portfolio is, by its very nature, highly
unlikely to worsen the granularity adjustment of a portfolio, whereby it is neither likely to
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greatly reduce the approximated granularity adjustment. Most likely the inclusion of all
retail exposures would marginally reduce the granularity adjustment, but the negligible
diﬀerence is why the retail portfolio can be excluded. Thus, such a excluding treatment
of the retail portfolio is a conservative approach that allows the capital requirement to
be marginally higher. (BCBS, 2001, p. 90, §427)
What might also be important to understand in this context is that ever since the draft-
ing of the Basel II framework, several analytical methodologies have been devised for
approximating the supplementary capital requirement for name concentration risk. (Fi-
nansinspektionen, 2009:b, p. 4) There is, for example, at least three Approaches for
how the granularity adjustment representing name concentrations could be estimated,
i.e. Approaches by Vasicek (2002), by Emmer & Tasche (2005) and by Gordy & Lütke-
bohmert (2007). A performed analysis of these three approaches concluded that the
third approach proposed by Gordy and Lütkebohmert is most applicable in practice and
furthermore holds fewer drawbacks than the other two approaches. (Beivydas et al, 2009,
p. 58) Thereafter, at least one additional approach for granularity adjustment for name
concentration has been devised by Gordy & Marrone (2010), having further developed
the work by Wilde (2001). (Gordy & Marrone, 2010) The basis for the choice of com-
pared methodologies is, however, only the proposals by FI since the application of these
methodologies are closer at hand for Swedish banks.
3.4 The Case Ikano Bank
In order to validate the resulting capital requirements for the generated portfolios pre-
sented in chapter 5, the two methodologies are also applied on a Swedish bank’s portfolio,
namely Ikano Bank’s leasing portfolio. The following section is therefore dedicated to a
presentation of this Swedish bank.
3.4.1 History And Information of Ikano Bank
Ikano Bank is historically linked with the globally well-known home furnishing company
IKEA. This background is a consequence of Ikano Bank being a part of Ikano Group
(Annual Report 2013, 2014, p. 3 & 14), which in 1988 were separated from IKEA and
became an independent group of companies owned by the Kamprad Family (Ikano Group,
2014). Ikano Bank was founded in 1995 and in accordance to their background the roots
are in Älmhult, while the headquarter is placed in Lund (Annual Report 2013, 2014,
p. 14). Today, Ikano Bank is represented in six geographical markets, namely Sweden,
Denmark, Norway, Finland, the Netherlands and the UK (Annual Report 2013, 2014,
p. 14). Meanwhile, their business to business operations currently exists in Sweden, Den-
mark and Norway. The business area “Corporate” oﬀers financing solutions to corporate
clients and organisations in the form of rental and lease agreements, object financing,
invoice purchasing as well as factoring. (Annual Report 2013, 2014, p. 14)
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3.4.1.1 Current Situation
The total assets of the bank at the end of last year amounted to 23 783 mSEK (An-
nual Report 2013, 2014, p. 14) and on the same date they had about 2 million active
customers (Annual Report 2013, 2014, p. 2). Total lending amounted to around 20 000
mSEK (Annual Report 2013, 2014, p. 2) and with roughly 700 employees, whereof around
30% of them in Sweden (Annual Report 2013, 2014, p. 10), the bank can be regarded
as a smaller player within the Swedish banking sector, dominated by four major banks
(Swedish Banker’s Association, 2013:a). The Swedish Bankers’ Association categorises
Ikano Bank as a niche bank (Swedish Banker’s Association, 2013:c), and resulting from
their IKEA-background they hold a unique situation with respect to knowledge of finan-
cial solutions and loyalty programs for companies similar to IKEA. (Annual Report 2013,
2014, p. 10)
3.4.2 Compliance With the Basel Agreements and Guidelines from FI
Needless to say, Ikano Bank complies with the capital adequacy requirements in the
Basel framework as well as with the guidelines from FI. However, due to the scope of the
thesis only compliance with regards to credit risk will be further addressed. Credit risk is
regarded as the Bank’s greatest risk, and Ikano defines it as the risk that a counterparty
fails to meet its obligations (Annual Report 2013, 2014, p. 16)(Capital adequacy and risk
management 2013, 2014, p. 3).
3.4.2.1 Current Methodology for the Capital Adequacy Requirements for
Credit Risk
When approximating capital requirements for credit risk, i.e. under Pillar 1, Ikano
Bank uses the Standardised Approach by FI. Overall, their capital adequacy exceeds
the minimum capital requirements by a wide margin. (Capital adequacy and risk man-
agement 2013, 2014, p. 8) The capital adequacy ratio (CAR, see Appendix B.1) at last
year-end was 16,7%, implying that the regulatory capital in relation to the minimum
capital requirements, i.e. the capital adequacy quotient, receives a ratio of 2,09. (Annual
Report 2013, 2014, p. 64) The Bank’s internal goal is that the CAR should at least exceed
14% (Annual Report 2013, 2014, p. 63) This buﬀer represents an additional margin suited
for the risk profile of the bank. (Capital adequacy and risk management 2013, 2014, p. 9)
In order to make sure that the CAR is suﬃcient, Ikano annually performs an ICAAP
in accordance with Pillar 2. Accordingly, an assessment of possible additional capital
requirements are made for all identified risks under Pillar 2. The high CAR implies that
Ikano Bank complies with the minimum requirements under Pillar 1, as well as by a
wide margin satisfies the internally assessed capital requirement under Pillar 2. (Capital
adequacy and risk management 2013, 2014, p. 9) Subsequently, within the ICAAP one of
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the risks Ikano Bank takes into consideration is credit concentration risk, for which the
Standardised Approach by FI is applied. (Capital adequacy and risk management 2013,
2014, p. 9) However, the risk department at Ikano Bank is interested in more advanced
methodologies in order to quantify and take into account skew distribution of exposures
in their portfolios.
3.4.3 A Leasing Portfolio at Ikano Bank
It is for a leasing portfolio at Ikano Bank that reality-based data is processed and used
when applying the two methodologies on Ikano Bank. This leasing portfolio consists
of around 34 000 individual exposures. Each exposure is a lease agreement concerning
leased assets of primarily oﬃce equipment, vehicles and cleaning equipment, all being
recognised as operational leases. (Annual Report 2013, 2014, p. 55) The amount of indi-
vidual exposures moreover correspond to roughly 16 000 exposures when aggregated to
individual counterparties, as well as after elimination of the exposures with a value equal
to 0. Around two-thirds of the portfolio’s number of exposures correspond to a credit
rating of A or better, which indicates that the portfolio is composed of mostly low-risk
lease agreements. The total value of the lease agreements in the portfolio, or in other
words the total EAD of the exposures in the portfolio, amount to nearly 2 700 mSEK.
The data set is slightly modified by Ikano Bank prior to the handover, but without
compromising the appearance and characteristics of the portfolio. A part of the modifi-
cation is also the anonymisation of data. This, however, does not aﬀect the portfolio’s
validating contribution to the thesis, since the actual counterparties of the individual
exposures are not of any interest. However, it is of interest to note that all the counter-
parties in the data set consists of corporates and sovereigns, whereas all lease agreements
to retail customers are disregarded.
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4 Theory
In this chapter a short introduction of common notations for portfolio characteristics is
presented along with explanations of the mathematical theory forming FI’s two proposed
methodologies for name concentration risk.
4.1 Common Notation for Credit Risk Calculations
A portfolio consists of several exposures to diﬀerent counterparties. Each exposure is
assigned a value of EAD, PD, LGD, andM , which are usually noted EADi, PDi, LGDi
and Mi for the i :th exposure. One counterparty may correspond to multiple exposures.
For calculation of name concentration risk it is, however, required that these exposures
are aggregated with respect to the counterparty, which means that all EADi for the same
counterparty are added together. To get a joint PDi, LGDi and Mi for the aggregated
exposures, diﬀerent techniques are used where weighted averages are commonly used.
4.2 Standardised Approach by FI
Swedish banks must at least comply with FI’s proposed methodology within the Stan-
dardised Approach, as long as they are not very small (Finansinspektionen, 2009:a, p. 1).
It is for this methodology important that an institute is able to aggregate their risk expo-
sures corresponding to the same obligor, and particularly for their biggest risk exposures.
FI furthermore gives institutes an opportunity to reduce their computational burden.
Instead of aggregating all their risk exposures, it is suﬃcient to only aggregate their 30
biggest risk exposures in the portfolio. (Finansinspektionen, 2009:a)
Herfindahl index, or HI, is a commonly accepted measure of concentration and it is
defined according to Appendix B.7. (U.S. Department of Justice, 2014) For the Stan-
dardised Approach of approximating name concentration risk, the HI is approximated
with the use of a share adjusted Herfindahl index (AHI). The AHI uses a HI30 which
is calculated based only on the 30 biggest aggregated exposures according to Equation
4. (Finansinspektionen, 2009:a, p. 5) Consequently the AHI is calculated according to
Equation 3, which then corresponds to an interval in Table 1 and consequently a per-
centage of capital requirement also shown in Table 1. For a simple example on how this
additional capital requirement is calculated, see Equation 2.
Capital RequirementPillar 2 = X% · Capital RequirementPillar 1 (2)
where the percentage, X, is assigned according to Table 1.
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4.2.1 Share Adjusted Herfindahl Index or AHI
AHI = HI30 ·
P30
i=1EADiPn
i=1EADi
(3)
where n denotes the total number of exposures in the portfolio and
HI30 =
30X
i=1
 2i where  i =
EADiP30
i=1EADi
. (4)
Regarding FI’s notation  i, it is more commonly accepted to use si. Consequently,
FI’s notation is the one used in Equation 4.
Table 1: Table on capital requirements based on AHI for name concentration (Finansin-
spektionen, 2009:c, p. 2).
AHI Capital requirement as a share of the Pillar 1
capital requirement for credit risk
AHI<0.01 0%
0.01 AHI<0.02 2%
0.02 AHI<0.04 4%
0.04 AHI<0.08 6%
0.08 AHI 8%
4.3 IRB Approach by FI; A Granularity Adjustment
An explanation and derivation regarding construction of the methodology Granularity
Adjustment (GA) proposed by FI is presented in Appendix A.1. Thus, only a brief ex-
planation of the methodology follows in this section.
Granularity Adjustment is a methodology for calculating additional capital requirement
associated with name concentration risk. The necessity of approximating this additional
risk owes to it being overlooked in calculations of Pillar 1 capital requirement, due to
the assumption of portfolio invariance. There exists several GA methodologies devised
by diﬀerent authors. FI propose Swedish IRB-approved banks to use the Granularity
Adjustment in accordance with a certain article (Finansinspektionen, 2009:b, p. 4). This
article was published in 2007 (Gordy & Lütkebohmert, 2007) and updated by the same
authors in 2013 under the name Granularity Adjustment for Regulatory Capital Assess-
ment (Gordy & Lütkebohmert, 2013). This article states a recommended formula of
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the add-on as follows below. Unless otherwise stated, all subsequent explanations are
retrieved from the latter article. The capital requirement according to the methodology
Granularity Adjustment is expressed as:
GA =
1
2K
nX
i=1
s2iCi( (Ki +Ri) Ki). (5)
where the parameter K corresponds to the total capital requirement for the portfolio,
i.e. a weighted average calculated as K =
Pn
i=1 siKi where the parameter si is each
exposures share of the total portfolio and Ki = ULiEADi is the asymptotic unexpected
capital requirement as a share of EADi. Furthermore, the parameter Ci is defined as
Ci =
V [LGDi] + E[LGDi]2
E[LGDi]
(6)
where the variance of LGD for each exposure, V [LGDi], needs to be estimated. The
variance of LGD can be described as V [LGDi] =   · E[LGDi] · (1   E[LGDi]). The
parameter Ri corresponds to the capital requirements for credit losses as a percentage
of EAD and Ki corresponds to the capital requirement for unexpected loss, UL, as a
percentage of EAD, that is:
si =
EADi
EADtot
Ki =
ULi
EADi
K =
Pn
i=1 ULiPn
i=1 EADi
=
Pn
i=1 siKi
V [LGDi] =   · E[LGDi] · (1  E[LGDi])
Ci =
V [LGDi]+E[LGDi]2
E[LGDi]
Ri =
ELi
EADi
= PDi·LGDi·EADIEADi = PDi · LGDi
(Finansinspektionen, 2009:b, p. 4-5)(Gordy & Lütkebohmert, 2013, p. 58)
FI makes assumptions regarding the two input parameters of the methodology Gran-
ularity Adjustment as the ones in the article Granularity Adjustment for Regulatory
Capital Assessment, i.e.   = 0, 25 and   = 4, 83 (Finansinspektionen, 2009:b, p. 4).
These estimations are described as a precision parameter and a recovery risk parameter
 [0, 1] (Gordy & Lütkebohmert, 2013, p. 43 & 47), which are more thoroughly described
and examined by Beivydas et al (2009, p. 51).
The resulting capital requirement under Pillar 2 is by FI transformed to be expressed
as a percentage of the capital requirement under Pillar 1. This is done by dividing the
expression 5 with the portfolio specific weighted average K. By the conversion from
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the original article, the resulting capital requirement for the Granularity Adjustment
is comparable with FI’s Standardised Approach. With the square of the portfolio spe-
cific weighted average K as well as the values of   and   inserted into Equation 5, the
expression now takes the form:
GA =
1
2K2
nX
i=1
s2i · (0, 25 + 0, 75LGDi)(4, 83 · (Ki +Ri) Ki). (7)
(Finansinspektionen, 2009:b)
Note that the article chooses to express the add-on as a share of a portfolio’s total
EAD (Gordy & Lütkebohmert, 2013, p. 58), while FI’s memorandum instead express
the add-on as a share of the Pillar 1 capital requirement (Finansinspektionen, 2009:b,
p. 4).
Also note that a factor of 100 is removed from FI’s formula, since it only serves to
express the add-on in percentage points.
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5 Analysis
To fulfill the main objective of the thesis, the performed comparison between the two
methodologies proposed by FI is explained in the following chapter. The chapter presents
how portfolios are generated and how the methodologies are applied for these portfolios,
as well as for the portfolio of the case company Ikano Bank. Important to note is that
both the methodologies are marginally modified to enable the comparison, whereas this
joint modification is presented. Throughout the analysis, the computational calculation
programme Matlab is used for performing calculations. One exception is when applying
the methodologies for the portfolio of the case company Ikano Bank, whereas Microsoft
Excel is used.
5.1 Generating Portfolios
A variation of portfolios are generated, which includes both examples portfolios and
realistic portfolios. Thus, the following presentation of these are organised in two sections.
Firstly, the example portfolios will be treated and consequently the generation of realistic
portfolios follows thereafter.
5.1.1 Generating Example Portfolios
To provide an understanding about appearance and terms regarding portfolios, a few
example portfolios are constructed and illustratively presented. One of the example port-
folios is the so-called reference portfolio, where the portfolio is homogeneous regarding
both EAD and PD. The other examples consist of portfolios with a high concentration,
but with a reduced skewness for each subsequent portfolio. The portfolios are concen-
trated when a few obligors represent a large share of the portfolios total EAD.
Important to note is that all the illustrated example portfolios are extreme cases com-
pared to realistic portfolios. Furthermore, note that their corresponding figures only
show the 50 biggest exposures of the example portfolio, i.e. the horisontal axis is not
comprehensive. The reason for this omission is for the illustrations to be readable. The
example portfolios all consist of N = 10 000 number of exposures each. The first example
portfolio, the reference portfolio P1, is illustrated in Figure 8. For a portfolio with these
characteristics the capital requirement for name concentration risk is negligibly low.
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Figure 8: First example portfolio, P1. The reference portfolio with homogeneous distri-
bution of EAD and PD.
The second example portfolio, P2, is illustrated in Figure 9a. This portfolio is highly con-
centrated and holds an extremely skewed EAD-distribution, as the first three exposures
represent 10, 9 and 8 percent of total portfolio EAD. The remaining 9 997 exposures
equally share 73 percent of the portfolio EAD. Consequently, for portfolios being this
concentrated the capital requirement for name concentration risk is high.
The third example portfolio, P3, is also highly concentrated and holds an extremely
skewed EAD-distribution, illustrated in Figure 9b. However, the first three exposures
does not represent as much of EAD as in the previous portfolio P2. They represent
5, 4 and 3 percent. Thus, the remaining 9 997 exposures equally share 88 percent of
the portfolio EAD. All else being equal, P3 therefore corresponds to a lower capital
requirement for name concentration risk compared to P2.
(a) Second example portfolio, P2. A portfolio
with an extremely skewed EAD-distribution.
(b) Third example portfolio, P3. A portfolio
with an extremely skewed EAD-concentration,
but lower than the foregoing example portfolio.
Figure 9: Illustration of EAD-distribution of the example portfolios P2 and P3.
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Example portfolio number four, P4, is likewise highly concentrated. However, the EAD-
distribution of the biggest exposures is rather gradually decreasing, in contrast to the
radical reduction in the foregoing example portfolios, see Figure 10a. The absolutely
biggest exposure represents 3 percent, while the 30 succeeding decrease by steps of 0,1
percent. Thus, 9 970 exposures equally share 53,5 percent of the portfolio EAD. A
portfolio with similar EAD-characteristics corresponds to a high capital requirement for
name concentration risk.
The fifth example portfolio P5, see Figure 10b, is similar to the P4. The 30 biggest
exposures, however, does not represent as much of total EAD as the previous portfolio
P4. In fact, they represent half the value. All else being equal, P5 therefore corresponds
to a lower capital requirement for name concentration risk compared to P4.
(a) Fourth example portfolio, P4. A portfo-
lio where the EAD-distribution decreases more
gradually than for P2 and P3.
(b) Fifth example portfolio, P5. A portfolio
where the decreasing EAD-distribution is lower
than for P4.
Figure 10: Illustration of EAD-distribution of the example portfolios P4 and P5.
After illustrating and describing these five generated example portfolios, the following
section will present how a large amount of realistic portfolios are generated. Conse-
quently, it is for these generated realistic portfolios that FI’s two methodologies for name
concentration risk later are applied.
5.1.2 Generating Realistic Portfolios
Portfolios are now generated in order to illustrate how the two methodologies capital
requirements diﬀer. The total number of generated portfolios amounts to 10 000. Since
both methodologies require a portfolio to be aggregated on a counterparty level, all port-
folios will be generated on this level, i.e. as if the aggregation had already occurred. Out
of all portfolios possible to generate, there are some that are more realistic then others.
Only such realistic portfolios are of interest for the comparison, whereas it is among these
that the selection of generated portfolios is made. Therefore, the sample of generated
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realistic portfolios is a subset of all realistic portfolios, as well as of all possible portfo-
lios, see Figure 11. The selection aims to provide an adequate sample to conduct the
comparison between the two methodologies. Thus, in order to mimic realistic portfolios,
the portfolios are generated based on assumptions for what is regarded reasonable for
realistic portfolios. This is done in order to attain somewhat generalisable conclusions of
the comparison’s result. The assumptions are explained below.
Figure 11: The generated realistic portfolios represent a subset of all realistic portfolios
as well as of all possible portfolios.
Firstly, the generated realistic portfolios consist of N = 10 000 exposures. This portfolio
size may be considered lower than the size of many actual portfolios, but suﬃciently
large to illustrate the resulting capital requirements for the two methodologies. As a
benchmark, the case company Ikano Bank’s leasing portfolio contains around 16 000 ag-
gregated exposures. Furthermore, each of these exposures are assigned values of Mi and
LGDi, whereas these values are assumed to be homogeneous for all exposures. LGD is
assumed to be LGDi = 0, 45 for all exposures in the generated realistic portfolios, which
is reasonable and conservative according to BCBS (2006, p. 67, §287). Mi is assumed to
have a value of 2, 5 years for all exposures, which also is reasonable according to BCBS
(2006, p. 74, §318).
Secondly, the distribution of EADi in the portfolios is explained. The realistic port-
folios are generated with anything from 1 up to 2 000 number of big exposures, i.e. the
first generated portfolio contains one big exposure while the two-thousandth generated
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portfolio contains 2 000 big exposures. The remaining exposures in every portfolio, which
thus amounts to between 9 999 and 8 000, are treated as small exposures. This process is
repeated five times in order to attain the total number of 10 000 portfolios, out of which
five portfolios contains one big exposure, five portfolios contains two big exposures etc.
up to five portfolios with 2 000 big exposures. The big exposures are assigned random
EADi-values in intervals, with respect to how many exposures are considered to be big
exposures. These intervals are described in Table 2, with a fixed EADi-interval when
portfolios consist of only up to a handful of big exposures. Furthermore, the remaining
small exposures that represent up to and including 90 percent of portfolios’ exposures
are randomly assigned values around an approximate value. The approximate assigned
value is based on the value if equally sharing the remaining total EAD. Finally, the 10
last percent of the exposures are assigned values so that they adjust the portfolio’s total
EAD to become equal to 1.
Table 2: Table of intervals for assignment of EADi and PDi-values for each exposure.
Note that when the number of big exposures (k) is less than 2 000, the k+1:th exposure
is assigned values according to intervals in the third row of the table.
Exposure number (i) EADi-intervall PDi-intervall
(k is the number of big exposures (as a share of portfolio total EAD)
which is fixed for one portfolio but
varies between generated portfolios)
1 - 5 [0.01 , 0.07] [0 , 0.01%]
6 - 2 000
h
0.3
k   0.32k , 0.3k + 0.32k ]
i
[0 , 0.1%]
(k+1) - 5 000
h
1 Pkj=1 EADj
N k   1N ·10 ,
1 Pkj=1 EADj
N k +
1
N ·10
i
[0 , 0.2%]
5 001 - 8 700
h
1 Pkj=1 EADj
N k   1N ·10 ,
1 Pkj=1 EADj
N k +
1
N ·10
i
[0.2 , 2%]
8 701 - 9 000
h
1 Pkj=1 EADj
N k   1N ·10 ,
1 Pkj=1 EADj
N k +
1
N ·10
i
[3.5 , 4.5%]
9 001 - 10 000 1 
P9000
k=1 EADi
0.1·N [0 , 0.1%]
Thirdly, the distribution of PDi in the portfolios is explained. Standard and Poor’s
publishes information about how many companies that exist within each given rating in
a certain geographical area, see Standard and Poor’s (2011). It is assumed that a bank’s
portfolio should consist of a similar composition with respect to PDi, regarding its ex-
posures. I.e., if there exist about 50% companies that are A-rated, a general portfolio
should consist of approximately 50% exposures with an A-rating. When determining the
PDi intervals illustrated in Table 2, it is assumed reasonable that the big exposures in
a portfolio are assigned the lowest values of PDi, relatively speaking. This is a conse-
quence of that it is unreasonable that a bank allows large credits to be exposed towards
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a risky counterparty. Furthermore, the approximate share of exposures that are assigned
a specific PDi in the generated realistic portfolios are listed in Table 3, which are in line
with the proportions published by Standard and Poor’s. These ratings are thereafter
assigned an interval based on the values of PDi that Ikano Bank assigns the diﬀerent
ratings, see Table 4.
Table 3: Table for assigned ratings in the generating of portfolios and their corresponding
possible values of PDi.
Rating Number of exposures assigned Intervals for assigning
PDi for each rating
A 50% [0% , 0.1%]
B 45% [0.2% , 2%]
C 5% [3.5% , 4.5%]
Table 4: Corresponding PDi for each rating according to Ikano Bank, slightly modified
due to secrecy.
Rating PDi corresponding to each rating
Gov (Government) 0.00%
AAA 0.11%
AA 0.10%
A 0.15%
B 1.47%
C 4.16%
NR (Non-Rated) 0.43%
According to Table 2, exposures are assigned values of PD between 0 to 4,5%. Corpo-
rate exposures’ minimum PD level is 0,03% (Basel II,p. 67, §285), whereas exposures
to sovereigns most often are considered a PD of 0%. Thus, the interval of 0 to 4,5%
implies that the generated realistic portfolios are allowed to include both sovereign and
corporate exposures, ranging from AAA- to C-rated. The reason for this implementation
is that the portfolios then mimics reasonable realistic portfolios.
When banks assign values of PDi to their exposures, each rating normally corresponds
to a certain value, as in Table 4 for Ikano Bank. For the generated realistic portfolios,
note that the values of PDi are randomly generated uniformly over the intervals and not
discrete. The reasons for assigning PDi to the exposures from a continuous interval is to
increase the variations and to avoid dependence in what the corresponding value of PDi
is given for each rating.
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To summarise, for each and every exposure values of EADi, PDi, LGDi and Mi is
assigned. Every combination of 10 000 such exposures then represents one generated re-
alistic portfolio. Furthermore, the total number of generated realistic portfolios amounts
to 10 000. In the following section the two methodologies are applied on these generated
portfolios.
5.2 Applying the Methodologies Standardised Approach and Granu-
larity Adjustment on All Generated Portfolios
After generating the example portfolios as well as the realistic portfolios, the two method-
ologies, i.e. the one within the Standardised Approach, see section 4.2, and FI’s proposed
Granularity Adjustment, see section 4.3, are now applied on each of these portfolios.
First, however, a description of how the methodologies are implemented is provided
in the following section. This is thereafter followed by a description of how the two
methodologies are applied for all the generated portfolios, which results in two capital
requirements for each portfolio, produced by the two methodologies respectively.
In FI’s versions of the two methodologies, their resulting capital requirements are given
as a percentage of the Pillar 1 capital requirement. Since all generated portfolios corre-
sponds to a diﬀerent Pillar 1 capital requirement, it complicates the interpretation of a
comparison. However, all generated portfolios have the same total EAD. Therefore it
is possible to compare the resulting capital requirement of the diﬀerent portfolios if it is
instead expressed as a percentage of the portfolios total EAD. The results from the two
methodologies are therefore converted into that form for the comparison. The conversion
is conducted by multiplying FI’s expressions for the two methodologies with a portfolio
specific value, i.e. the weighted average K, whereas the expression as a percentage of
EAD is attained.
In the application the variables   and   used in Granularity Adjustment, see Equa-
tion 7 and its preceding section, are set to   = 0.25 and   = 4.83. This is in line with
both the article Granularity Adjustment for Regulatory Capital Assessment and what FI
states in their proposal, see Gordy & Lütkebohmert (2013, p. 46) and Finansinspektionen
(2009:b, p. 4).
5.3 Illustrating Capital Requirement when Applying the Two Method-
ologies
In order to illustrate patterns and features of the two methodologies, the resulting cap-
ital requirements for the generated portfolios are graphically illustrated. This is done
firstly for the example portfolios and secondly for the selected sample of generated real-
istic portfolios with diverse characteristics. In the following section all illustrations are
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presented with two diﬀerent sets of measurements on the axes. The usage of two set of
measurements allows for a wider range of conclusions. The illustrations are presented in
2-dimensional scatter plots for the example portfolios and 3-dimensional scatter plots for
the generated realistic portfolios. Consequently, these 3-dimensional figures are shown in
four diﬀerent angles to give the reader an enhanced understanding of the 3-dimensional
appearances. These four angles are presented as subfigures in a joint figure.
The resulting capital requirement from the Standardised Approach for each portfolio
corresponds to blue circles in all upcoming illustrations. The resulting capital require-
ment from the Granularity Adjustment is, on the other hand, represented by red crosses.
The first set of axes consist of HI, weighted average PD and Capital Requirement,
where HI is calculated according to B.7 and PD according to the definition in Equa-
tion 8. These dimensions indicate the entire portfolio’s features, but not specifically how
the large exposures relate to the others. In order to draw conclusions about how the
large exposures relate to the other exposures for the various portfolios, the resulting cap-
ital requirements are also illustrated with the measurements AHI, APD and Capital
Requirement on the axes. AHI is an adjusted Herfindal Index, see Equation 3, while
APD is an adjusted measure of the weighted average PD, see Equation 9. Both these
measured values determine how the 30 biggest exposures relate to the other exposures
for the various generated portfolios.
The variation of measurements on the axes is repeated for the example portfolios’ re-
sulting capital requirements and also for the generated portfolios’ capital requirements.
Later on this variation is also repeated when applying the methodologies on Ikano Bank’s
leasing portfolio, see section 5.4.1.
In order to understand forthcoming illustrations resulting from applying the method-
ologies on the generated portfolios, an improved understanding of measurements on the
axes is required. Consequently, these measurements are presented hereinafter.
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5.3.1 Measurements for Comparing Appearances of Diﬀerent Portfolios
In this section the two created measurements are explained. These are weighted average
PD and APD, which are both used to demonstrate the appearance of diﬀerent portfolios
and thus allow for the comparison.
PD is a weighted average value of probability of default for a portfolio, that takes the
whole portfolios appearance into account.
PD =
nX
i=1
si · PDi where si = EADiPn
i=1EADi
(8)
APD is a weighted average value of probability of default for the 30 biggest exposures
in a portfolio. Thus, it is an equivalent measure to the weighted average PD, adjusted
in order to correspond to the AHI measure proposed by FI.
APD =
30X
i=1
si · PDi where si = EADiP30
i=1EADi
. (9)
5.3.2 Illustrating Resulting Capital Requirement for the Example Portfolios
All example portfolios are homogeneous with regard to the values of PDi for each ex-
posure. The portfolios therefore have the same value assigned to each exposure, i.e.
PDi = 0.001 regardless of i. As a consequence, the weighted average PD for these
portfolios are identical. Therefore, the example portfolios are presented in two dimen-
sions instead of all three when illustrating capital requirement for the two methodolo-
gies. This means excluding the axis with weighted average PD, i.e. the used axes
are HI,Capital Requirement and AHI,Capital Requirement respectively. Figure 12a
illustrates the example portfolios resulting capital requirement with the axes HI and
Capital Requirement. The reference portfolio, P1, is located on low values of both HI
and Capital Requirement, i.e. close to origo in Figure 12a. In the same Figure, example
portfolio P2 and P3 corresponds to high values of Capital Requirement, whereof P2
receives the highest. Furthermore, example portfolios P4 and P5 also results in high
values of Capital Requirement, although somewhat lower. Comparing P4 and P5, P4
receives the highest capital requirement. Example portfolio P4 implies a higher HI than
P3, whereby it is important to clarify that the illustration mainly aims to compare the
diﬀerence in capital requirement from P3 with P2 and P4 with P5 respectively.
Figure 12b on the other hand illustrates the results from the two methodologies with
axes AHI and Capital Requirement, instead of using HI. Once more the reference
portfolio, P1 is located close to origo, i.e. with low values of both AHI and Capital
Requirement. The other four example portfolios are located on higher values of both
AHI and Capital Requirement and in descending order regarding the sequence they are
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presented, i.e. P5 is located closest to the reference portfolio. The reason for the graph’s
appearance, i.e. with a non-linear relation regarding the diﬀerence between the method-
ologies, is that in both P2 and P3 there is a high concentration among the 30 biggest
exposures which thus results in a higher AHI. P4 is, however, treated as more concen-
trated in terms of the overall portfolio and thereof results in a higher capital requirement.
That a non-linear relation is possible is an important insight. As will be illustrated later
on, this relation also applies when portfolios’ resulting capital requirements are observed
in relation to HI.
(a) First set of axes, regarding the appereance
of all exposures.
(b) Second set of axes, regarding the appear-
ance of the 30 biggest exposures.
Figure 12: Illustrations of the example portfolios’ resulting capital requirement for name
concentration risk in two dimensions. Red crosses correspond to capital requirements
from Granularity Adjustment while blue circles correspond to capital requirements from
the Standardised Approach.
After illustrating the capital requirement for the five generated example portfolios, the
following section will present resulting capital requirement for the generated realistic
portfolios.
5.3.3 Illustrating Resulting Capital Requirement for the Realistic Portfolios
The methodologies are applied on each of the 10 000 generated portfolios and the resulting
capital requirements when using the first set of axes are illustrated in Figure 13. The
resulting capital requirements with the second set of axes are then illustrated in 14.
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5.3.3.1 The first set of axes
Starting with the first set of axes it can be seen that the capital requirement from Gran-
ularity Adjustment in most cases exceed the capital requirements from the Standardised
Approach, see Figure 13. On the contrary, for generated portfolios with a relatively high
weighted average PD, it can be seen that those of these with a slightly higher HI most
often results in a lower required capital from the Granularity Adjustment than the Stan-
dardised Approach. This relationship is specifically clarified in Figure 13c and Figure 13d.
The generated portfolios’ HI-value varies between 0.0001 and 0.017, see Figure 13b. This
is desirable in order to cover several variations of realistic portfolios. A general tendency
among the generated and illustrated portfolios is that for portfolios with a higher HI, the
portfolios also result in a higher capital requirement. Accordingly, both methodologies’
resulting capital requirement increases for increasing HI, but the Granularity Adjust-
ment implies a much steeper increasing slope. This steeper slope consequently generates
an increasing diﬀerence between the two methodologies. For the methodology within
the Standardised Approach it is furthermore possible to observe a staircase-like increase
in capital requirement for generated portfolios with higher HI. The increase in resulting
capital requirement from the Granularity Adjustment, on the other hand, seems to imply
somewhat linear relationship to HI, at least for the majority of the generated portfolios.
However, there exists portfolios over large parts of the range of generated HI values
where the Granularity Adjustment result in lower capital requirement than the method-
ology within the Standardised Approach, see Figure 13b. This shows that the outcome
is possible, even though it only occurs for a small fraction of the generated portfolios.
Moreover, a majority of the generated portfolios results in a value of weighted average
PD in the range of 0.004 to 0.005, see Figure 13d. The reason for why some portfolios
deviate is most likely that the assigned PDi for several exposures are simultaneously
randomised high or low in the interval of PDi for the exposures.
Finally, Figure 13a shows that there is a large accumulation of portfolios with very low
HI relative to other generated portfolios, and thus low capital requirement. For these
portfolios, there exists a spread in weighted average PD and their capital requirements
are very low relative to the other generated portfolios.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 13: Diﬀerent angles of resulting capital requirements for name concentration risk
for the 10 000 generated realistic portfolios with the first set of axes. Red crosses corre-
spond to capital requirements from Granularity Adjustment while blue circles correspond
to capital requirements from the Standardised Approach.
5.3.3.2 The second set of axes
Concerning the second set of axes, the overall observation that the GA methodology
results in a higher capital requirement than the methodology within the Standardised
Approach is of course also noted. However, the step-like tendency for the portfolios’ Stan-
dardised Approach will be even more prominent, and this is in accordance with what is
expected given the definition of the methodology and that the portfolios are illustrated
with respect to AHI.
Furthermore, the generated portfolios result in much lower weighted average of APD,
i.e. when it is measured only for the 30 biggest exposures with respect to EADi instead
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of the whole portfolio. This observation is a result of the lower interval that is set in the
generation of portfolios for the biggest exposure. This lower range is set similar to all
generated portfolios and therefore the results are accumulated around weighted average
PD = 0.0005. This accumulation can be seen in Figure 14 and very clear in Figure 14c.
This can be considered as a low value, but realistic given that the 30 biggest exposures in
real portfolios most likely consist of a combination of Government and A-rated corporate
exposures.
The small accumulation of generated portfolios with relatively low weighted average
APD values and high values of AHI, is interesting, see Figure 14a and Figure 14c. The
generated portfolios with these characteristics, in a majority of the outcomes, result in
lower values of Granularity Adjustment than the Standardised Approach, see Figure 14b
and 14d. To better understand the appearance of these portfolios, they are portfolios
in which the 30 biggest exposures exhibit skewness and are given a large portion of the
portfolio total EAD. Simultaneously, these big exposures are assigned low values of PDi,
thus reducing the weighted average APD.
Furthermore, it is interesting that in the generated range of AHI, it seems possible that
the Granularity Adjustment methodology result in lower capital requirement regardless
of low or high values of the portfolios’ AHI. It is also observed that the generated
portfolios can result in lower required capital from Granularity Adjustment than the
Standardised Approach in the generated APD interval, as is clearly shown in 14d, i.e.
both relatively high and low APD can result in Granularity Adjustment giving a lower
value than the methodology within the Standardised Approach.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 14: Diﬀerent angles of resulting capital requirements for name concentration risk
for the 10 000 generated realistic portfolios with the second set of axes. Red crosses corre-
spond to capital requirements from Granularity Adjustment while blue circles correspond
to capital requirements from the Standardised Approach.
5.4 Applying and Illustrating the Methodologies on Ikano Bank’s Port-
folio
In the following section, the two methodologies Standardised Approach and Granularity
Adjustment are applied on the leasing portfolio of Ikano Bank. For this application the
converted methodologies are applied, i.e. when multiplying FI’s proposed methodologies
with the portfolio specific weighted average K. This is done in accordance with the
previously explained application on all generated portfolios. Likewise, the assumptions
made by FI are regarded as valid also for this application. To repeat, the assumptions
are thus  =0,25 and  =4,83 for the portfolio, while LGDi=0,45 and Mi=2,5 is assigned
to every exposure. Both the use of the converted methodologies and the use of the same
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underlying assumptions is chosen in order to attain resulting capital requirements com-
parable with the generated realistic portfolios.
Based on the raw data presented from Ikano, some processing of the data set is made.
It is controlled that metrics exist on all relevant parameters. Furthermore, the data set
is controlled regarding whether there are any outliers or missing values. Moreover, since
all exposures are expressed on an individual level, they are all aggregated to counter-
party level since this is a requirement for application of both methodologies. Finally, all
aggregated exposures for which the EADi amounts to 0 are excluded from the data set.
Subsequently, the remaining data is then used when applying the two methodologies,
whose capital requirements for name concentration risk is illustrated in the forthcoming
section.
5.4.1 Illustrating Resulting Capital Requirement for Ikano Bank’s Portfolio
The resulting capital requirements when applying the two methodologies for Ikano Bank’s
portfolio are presented by adding them to the previously illustrated Figures 13 and 14
of all generated portfolios. The resulting capital requirement for Ikano Bank’s leasing
portfolio is therefore illustrated as two additional data points in Figures 15 and 16, in
the shape of a green cross and a green circle. This is done in order to clarify where
Ikano Bank’s portfolio is positioned in respect to the generated realistic portfolios. Once
more the variation of measurements on the axes is performed. Thus, the first illustration
consist of HI, PD, Capital Requirement while the second illustration consist of AHI,
APD, Capital Requirement.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 15: Diﬀerent angles of resulting capital requirements for name concentration risk
for the 10 000 generated portfolios and Ikano Bank’s portfolio, with the first set of axes.
Red crosses correspond to capital requirements from Granularity Adjustment while blue
circles correspond to capital requirements from the Standardised Approach. The green
markings represent Ikano Bank’s portfolio.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 16: Diﬀerent angles of resulting capital requirements for name concentration risk
for the 10 000 generated portfolios and Ikano Bank’s portfolio, with the second set of
axes. Red crosses correspond to capital requirements from Granularity Adjustment while
blue circles correspond to capital requirements from the Standardised Approach. The
green markings represent Ikano Bank’s portfolio.
5.4.1.1 The two set of axes
As can be seen in Figures 15b and 16b, the resulting value from the methodology within
the Standardised Approach is positioned in the "second step of the stair". Furthermore,
the resulting value from the Granularity Adjustment is slightly above the generated
portfolios with respect to HI, but on an equal level with respect to AHI. Ikano Bank’s
portfolio results in a slightly lower weighted average PD than the generated portfolios
and at the same time higher weighted average APD, see Figure 15c and 16c. This can
be explained by that the portfolio of Ikano Bank contains slightly higher PDi values
on its 30 biggest exposures, in comparison to the generated portfolios. Furthermore,
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Ikano Bank’s portfolio’s lower value of weighted average PD is explained by that a larger
proportion of their portfolios total EAD probably consist of exposures corresponding to
lower PDi, compared with the generated portfolios.
The deviation in PD and APD axes are after all understandable. Additionally, with
respect to the level of resulting capital requirements, it is possible to say that Ikano
Bank’s portfolio somewhat validates the generated portfolios plausibility.
The resulting capital requirements for name concentration risk when applying the two
methodologies on Ikano’s modified leasing portfolio are also presented in Table 5. As
previously mentioned, note that the percentages are expressed as a share of total port-
folio EAD. The total EAD of Ikano Bank’s leasing portfolio is 2 699 261 275 SEK.
The resulting capital requirements are also expressed in SEK in order to more clearly
illustrate their actual monetary value.
Table 5: Resulting capital requirements for Ikano Bank’s leasing portfolio.
Methodology As a percentage of total portfolio EAD In SEK
Standardised Approach 0.068874% 1 859 083
Granularity Adjustment 0.226513% 6 114 190
Furthermore, most important for the thesis is the diﬀerences in resulting capital require-
ments between the two methodologies. Therefore, these diﬀerences are especially clarified
for the generated portfolios as well as for Ikano Bank’s portfolio. With the purpose of
clarification, chapter 6 will illustrate Figures 15 and 16 again, but instead with the dif-
ference in capital requirement between the methodologies on the vertical axis.
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6 Diﬀerences in Resulting Capital Requirements Between
the Two Methodologies
In order to more clearly present how the methodologies resulting capital requirements
diﬀer for each portfolio, scatter plots of the diﬀerence in capital requirement are gener-
ated, see Figures 17 and 18. These scatter plots include all generated portfolios as well
as Ikano Bank’s portfolio. They provide further opportunity to discover for which of
the diﬀerent portfolios, i.e. for diﬀerent values of HI and PD or AHI and APD, that
the methodologies diﬀer regarding resulting capital requirement. Furthermore, they also
facilitate the identification of patterns as the two methodologies are applied.
In both sets of axes, some already described patterns are again illustrated. An example
is that among the generated portfolios it is for those with a higher HI that most often
result in a higher diﬀerence in capital requirement between the methodologies. What
can also be noted is that among the generated portfolios, the spread of the diﬀerence
between the methodologies is greater for portfolios with high values on HI.
Moreover, in the first set of axes it is more clearly illustrated that there exists port-
folios with negative diﬀerences, i.e. where the Granularity Adjustment results in a lower
value of resulting capital requirement than the methodology within Standardised Ap-
proach, as well as where they are located. These portfolios can easily be found in Figures
17b and 17d where they are positioned below zero. These portfolios are spread over dif-
ferent values of HI and with relatively high values of PD. Consequently, the portfolios
are visible as a streak of points with high values of PD, illustrated in Figures 17c and 17d.
Furthermore, it is illustrated that the same portfolios with negative diﬀerences are pre-
sented as points scattered across AHI, but with an emphasis on relatively high values,
see Figure 18b. In terms of the weighted average APD for these particular portfolios,
they can be found at low values of APD, see Figure 18c. Thus, the portfolios that gener-
ate lower values for Granularity Adjustment than the Standardised Approach are those
whose 30 biggest exposures are assigned low values of PDi and is relatively undiversified
in terms of EADi, i.e. where a concentration exists among the 30 biggest exposures.
They are simultaneously such portfolios, in accordance with the previously conducted
argument on the first set of axes, that result in relatively high weighted average PD and
which constitute a part of the lower values for generatedHI. Thus, these portfolios result
in low PDi for their 30 biggest exposures in relation to the remaining smaller exposures,
as these are assigned relatively high PDi.
It is thus the generated portfolios with very diﬀerent PDi for the large and small expo-
sures that generate lower capital requirement when applying the Granularity Adjustment
than when applying the methodology within the Standardised Approach.
56
Regarding the relationship between capital requirements from Ikano Bank’s leasing port-
folio and the generated portfolios, nothing can be added to the reasoning already pre-
sented. However, Figures 17 and 18 illustrate a validation that the size of the diﬀerences
in capital requirements are reasonable for the generated portfolios.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 17: With the first set of axes, four angles of the diﬀerence in resulting capital
requirements for name concentration risk between the two methodologies, for each of the
10 000 generated portfolios and Ikano Bank’s portfolio. Note that the diﬀerence is cal-
culated as capital requirement from Granularity Adjustment minus capital requirement
from the Standardised Approach. The green markings represent Ikano Bank’s portfolio.
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The diﬀerence in capital requirement between the two methodologies are now presented
with the second set of axes, see Figure 18.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 18: With the second set of axes, four angles of the diﬀerence in resulting capital
requirements for name concentration risk between the two methodologies, for each of the
10 000 generated portfolios and Ikano Bank’s portfolio. Note that the diﬀerence is cal-
culated as capital requirement from Granularity Adjustment minus capital requirement
from the Standardised Approach. The green markings represent Ikano Bank’s portfolio.
Based on the reasoning and illustrations presented in chapter 5 and chapter 6, the re-
sulting conclusions will be presented hereinafter.
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7 Conclusion
For a majority of the generated realistic portfolios, the Granularity Adjustment methodol-
ogy results in a higher capital requirement than the Standardised Approach. An observed
feature of both methodologies is that they both typically result in higher capital require-
ments when applied on generated portfolios with comparatively high HI and AHI. This
conclusion is intuitively reasonable considering that the methodologies are intended to
approximate the additional risk of a concentration, while HI and AHI are measurements
that demonstrate concentration.
Another observed pattern is that the diﬀerence in capital requirement between the
methodologies typically tends to increases as the distribution of EADi in the portfo-
lios is more concentrated, implying high HI and AHI. The pattern of larger deviation
therefore indicates greater uncertainty for the portfolios with more concentrated distri-
bution of EADi. For the interval of HI and AHI formed by the generated portfolios, the
Granularity Adjustment seems to imply somewhat linear relationship with HI and AHI.
This relationship applies for far from all generated portfolios, but since the Standardised
Approach does not imply the same tendency of a steep slope it is anyhow a reason for
the pattern of increasing diﬀerence in capital requirement.
Moreover, some of the generated realistic portfolios display a relation contrary to the
majority, i.e. where the Granularity Adjustment methodology results in a relatively
lower capital requirement than the Standardised Approach. These portfolios are illus-
trated in the figures and the most interesting ones are explained in chapter 5 and chapter
6. A common characteristic of the explained portfolios is that the 30 biggest exposures
correspond to a low PDi in relation to the remaining exposures. As an example, consider
two portfolios A and B with the same distribution of EADi, and accordingly equal HI as
well as AHI. If portfolio B contains a lower PDi for the 30 biggest exposures, portfolio
B results in a relatively lower capital requirement from both methodologies. This result
is fully consistent with what is intuitive.
However, an interesting insight is drawn for the same two portfolios A and B, but when
portfolio B instead contains a higher PDi for several of the small exposures. In this case,
portfolio B may in fact also result in a relatively lower capital requirement from Granu-
larity Adjustment. But for these characteristics, portfolio B will simultaneously result in
a slightly higher capital requirement from the Standardised Approach since it indirectly
depends on the Pillar 1 capital requirement. The diﬀerence between portfolio A and
B implies a reduced result for one of the methodologies and an increased result for the
other, when comparing A and B’s resulting capital requirements. This implies that the
methodologies move in an opposite direction, which is counterintuitive. The described
phenomenon is one reason for why the diﬀerence between the two methodologies for
some portfolios is negative, but also for why the Granularity Adjustment appears more
scattered. The summarised conclusion from this observed phenomenon is that the rela-
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tionship between the large and small exposures’ assigned PDi is of great importance for
how the two methodologies’ resulting capital requirements diﬀer. Furthermore, it seems
that in order for the outcome to occur, i.e. that the Standardised Approach exceeds the
Granularity Adjustment, the 30 biggest exposures need to be assigned low PDi since
they are required to be low in relation to the PDi of the smaller exposures. Finally, the
relationship between PDi for a portfolio’s large and small exposures leads to the large
deviation between the methodologies’ diﬀerences, which as mentioned is most prominent
for portfolios with high HI and AHI.
The implied relation that an increased EADi-concentration in most cases results in a high
capital requirement, is a conclusion that is more diﬃcult than expected to draw. This is
a conclusion by itself, which depends on the significant impact of the PDi-distribution.
However, it can be stated that for two portfolios with the same PDi on the exposures, a
higher concentration leads to a higher capital requirement for both the compared method-
ologies.
When diﬀerences between the methodologies are illustrated in Figures 17 and 18, a large
proportion of the portfolios where the methodology within the Standardised Approach
exceeds the Granularity Adjustment share the characteristics of high weighted average
PD, low APD, low HI and high AHI in relative terms. For these generated portfolios
the negative diﬀerence occurs in a majority of the portfolios. A conclusion is thus that
for portfolios sharing these characteristics, it is highly probable that the two method-
ologies can result in capital requirements with the same relationship, namely where the
Standardised Approach exceeds Granularity Adjustment.
A final conclusion is that the inclusion of Ikano Bank’s leasing portfolio to the com-
parison validates that the size of the capital requirements as well as the size of the
diﬀerences are reasonable for the generated portfolios. Particularly, it confirms the va-
lidity of the closest positioned portfolios, for which the patterns and features of interest
are demonstrated.
60
8 Discussion
First of all, our main conclusion is that the relationship between a portfolio’s large and
small exposures in terms of assigned PDi is of great importance for how the two method-
ologies’ resulting capital requirements diﬀer. To further clarify, it is this relationship that
aﬀects the diﬀerence in capital requirements between the two methodologies, rather than
the actual levels of PDi for the big and small exposures.
It should be noted that it is not possible to draw generalised conclusions based on one
or very few generated realistic portfolios’ resulting capital requirements. A pattern of
several generated realistic portfolios with similar characteristics, that gives similar re-
sults, is needed. This is due to that the generated portfolios only constitute a subset
of the possible and realistic portfolios. Consequently, the observed patterns in resulting
capital requirement results from outcomes of our generated portfolios. Thus, portfolios
with identical HI, PD or AHI, APD as the ones generated, but with slightly diﬀerent
appearance, may result in diﬀerent resulting capital requirements. This is due to that
these measurements does not cover all types of variations in characteristics of the portfo-
lios. Thus, a randomness of resulting capital requirement for a certain combination of the
two measurements occurs. Furthermore, a suﬃcient amount of realistic portfolios is not
generated to be able to say how the resulting capital requirement ought to look for one
portfolio with a particular combination of HI, PD or AHI, APD. The only conclusions
that can be drawn regarding portfolios with a certain combination of HI, PD or AHI,
APD is that they may give rise to the obtained resulting capital requirements. Thus,
it should be noted that these are not the actual capital requirements that apply to all
portfolios with identical set of values for HI, PD or AHI, APD.
Note that, as previously mentioned, the generated portfolios are not the only ones pos-
sible to generate since they represent a subset of all possible portfolios. Thus, it is
debatable why we choose to generate precisely the portfolios selected. We believe the
assumptions to be well-founded and that the portfolios thus represent characteristics of
reasonable portfolios. Simultaneously, the results do not deviate significantly from Ikano
Bank’s leasing portfolio and the deviation that arises is understandable. According to
the authors this can be viewed upon as a validating indication of the generated portfolios’
realism.
Furthermore, we stick to our reasoning that the biggest exposures in real portfolios most
often are assigned low values of PDi. A bank would more likely lend a big share of their
money to relatively safe obligors, instead of risky ones. The generated distribution of
PDi is therefore considered to reflect the distribution in actual realistic portfolios. The
fact that Ikano Bank somewhat deviates is understandable, and given the explanation
for the deviation it has no limiting eﬀect of the comparison of the thesis.
61
Additionally, some of the generated realistic portfolios may be considered as extreme cases
of realistic portfolios. The most easily definable such extreme cases are the generated
realistic portfolios with one or a few really big exposures, and where the remaining expo-
sures are extremely small in comparison. These are still interesting to generate in order
to present the two methodologies’ resulting capital requirement for a variety of portfolios.
When generating portfolios, PDi for each exposure is assigned randomly within intervals,
not discrete as for exposures in real portfolios. This is done in order to avoid limiting
the generated portfolios to depend on particular values assigned to each rating. Since
the aim is to generate a variation of portfolios with diverse characteristics, we consider
this to be an advantage as it results in a greater variety.
For assigning the amount of a portfolio’s exposures included within each rating, a distri-
bution of rated companies published by Standard and Poor’s is used. This might be an
assumption that leads to diﬀerences with realistic portfolios, since all portfolio does not
necessarily corresponds to a cross section of existing companies.
Prior to the conducted comparison, our understanding was that the methodology within
the Standardised Approach was a conservative methodology, i.e. that it would result
in higher resulting capital requirements for a majority of the portfolios. However, the
observed result of the comparison shows the opposite. This may provide a basis for ques-
tioning whether the methodologies work as they are intended. A possible reason why
the two methodologies do not work as intended, may be that the assumed values of the
parameters   and   are not adapted to the present conditions. These parameters are
not updated since 2007, when the article Granularity Adjustment for Regulatory Capital
Assessment is written, see Gordy & Lütkebohmert (2007). Thus, they were not changed
when the article was updated in 2013, see Gordy & Lütkebohmert (2013). Perhaps, these
parameters are estimated for a whole other economical climate than the current climate.
The counterintuitive tendency implying that the two methodologies can move in oppo-
site directions, when changing a portfolio, might provide a basis for questioning whether
the two methodologies that FI propose goes in line with each other. Furthermore, the
distribution of PDi should intuitively not have such a significant influence as observed,
since it is already incorporated when calculating the capital requirement for credit risk
under Pillar 1. But as demonstrated, the distribution of PDi significantly influences the
results. This is especially the case for the Granularity Adjustment methodology, since it
directly takes the PDi-distribution into account. The methodology within the Standard-
ised Approach only indirectly takes the PDi-distribution into account, and is therefore
only marginally aﬀected. The methodologies’ diverse dependence on PDi-distribution
also adds to the questioning to what extent the proposed methodologies are working in
line with each other.
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The methodologies proposed by FI remains firm, but credit concentration risk is mean-
while a field where new methodologies evidently are being added. Therefore, we believe
that it is important to be vigilant and adaptable since proposing an outdated method-
ology may pose risks to the financial stability. Improved methodologies will most likely
be devised and it is important for banks to stay updated and not only comply with FI’s
proposed methodologies currently in force.
Regarding the Granularity Adjustment methodology, one might ask if the gamma distri-
bution on the systematic risk factor X is a suitable distribution to assume. The conducted
comparison is performed with this assumption, since it is incorporated in FI’s proposal.
The gamma distribution indeed implies a larger and wider tail than the normal distri-
bution, which means that it becomes more of a "safe bet". However, there exists other
distributions that implies even larger and wider tails, that would lead to even higher
capital requirements. Perhaps, such a distribution is even more appropriate to use? This
is a suggestion for further research, which is built on in the following paragraph.
8.1 Suggestions for Further Research
An interesting topic for additional research is that someone with more time and resources
can perform a similar comparative study, yet more comprehensive. Such a study could
consist of all possible combinations of portfolios and the resulting capital requirements
for each portfolio combination, i.e. combinations of diﬀerent HI, PD and AHI, APD.
Furthermore such a study could instead present the expected outcome of the method-
ologies’ resulting capital requirements, when applying them on a suﬃcient number of
portfolios with a certain combination of measurements. The uncertainty in our portfolio
generation to some extent eﬀects the resulting capital requirements, but for the proposed
study the uncertainty would drastically reduce. Furthermore, when performing such a
more comprehensive study, a suggestion is to add an additional set of axes, where the
measurement APD/PD-ratio is on one axis. This would probably allow for additional
interesting result. For those who want to replicate or further develop our comparison,
the implemented Matlab code can be found in Appendix D.
Another interesting topic for further research is the assumptions of the parameters  
and  . An examination of their relevance to the conclusions of the comparison of the two
methodologies is very interesting.
Furthermore, the appropriateness of the gamma-distribution on the single systematic
risk factor X could also be studied and evaluated, since it is an assumption that signifi-
cantly influences the Granularity Adjustment methodology.
Finally, it would be interesting to conduct the comparison for additional methodolo-
gies than the two selected. Examples of such methodologies are Monte Carlo simulations
and other variations of the Granularity Adjustment. The article Measuring Concentra-
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tion Risk in Bank Credit Portfolios Using Granularity Adjustment: Practical Aspects,
however, states that tests show that a large number of Monte Carlo simulations needs to
be performed in order to even come close to the precision that the proposed Granularity
Adjustment methodology results in (Beivydas et al, 2009, p. 57). Therefore a variation of
the Granularity Adjustment would be more interesting to include in future comparisons.
Such a variation could be to change the assumption regarding Value at Risk, VaR, in the
methodology and instead use Expected Shortfall, ES.
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A Appendix
A.1 Derivation of the Granularity Adjustment Formula
This derivation of the Granularity Adjustment is strongly influenced by the one per-
formed by Gordy and Lütkebohmert in their article Granularity Adjustment for Reg-
ulatory Capital Assessment, see (Gordy & Lütkebohmert, 2013), complemented with
additional clarifications.
To provide a good understanding of how the additional capital requirement for con-
centration risk is calculated, an explanation and derivation regarding the construction of
general GA is presented.
Let X assign the systematic risk factor. X has a certain distribution, most often as-
sumed to be normally distributed. X is unidimensional and for each given value in the
distribution X is assigned a value.
Let Ln denote the share of loss for a portfolio, also called portfolio loss rate, as fol-
lows:
Ln =
nX
i=1
siUi (10)
where si represents every exposures share of the total exposures, that is:
si =
AiPn
j=1Aj
(11)
and Ui denotes share of loss for the exposure. This share increases when the systematic
risk factor X increases.
Define the conditional expected loss µ(x) by strictly increasing in x.
µ(x) = E[Ln|X = x]. (12)
Observe that the notation µ(x) not corresponds to E[X]. µ(x) is assumed to be strictly
increasing when x is increasing. Let ↵q(Y ) correspond to the qth percentile of the random
variable Y, so that the Value at Risk (VaR) at the qth percentile can be written as ↵q(Ln).
For details regarding VaR see Appendix B.12. As n grows large it can be seen that:
|↵q(Ln)  E[Ln|X = x]|! 0 (13)
which with the insertion of x can be written as:
|↵q(Ln)  E[Ln|X = ↵q(X)]|! 0. (14)
Equation 14 shows that ↵q(Ln) converges to the conditional expected value of Ln when
the number of credits grows. This is because, all else being equal, si decreases for any
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given exposure when several exposures are added. When each exposure contributes less
to Ln, the Ln-distribution’s right tail decreases. The gap between ↵q(Ln) and its asymp-
totic lower limit µ(↵q(X)), according to Equation 14, is attributable to non diversified
idiosyncratic risk in the portfolio. This idiosyncratic risk cannot be obtained in exact
analytical form, but approximated via Taylor-series expansion.
E[Ln|X = ↵q(X) is the expected percentage loss for the portfolio given a certain system-
atic risk factor; X, when adopting q-percentile. ↵q(Ln) is the percentile of the random
distribution (includes non diversified unsystematic risk) and when n increases, ↵q(Ln)
decreases and converges to E[Ln|X = ↵q(X) (can also be intuitively explained as the
unsystematic risk being diversified when n increases).
The Granularity Adjustment methodology identifies systematic (undiversifiable) risk and
unsystematic (idiosyncratic, diversifiable) risk. The terms defined are:
W = total risk,
Y = systematic risk ,
Z = unsystematic risk.
This implies that the total risk can be written as W = Y + Z It is the unsystem-
atic risk Z which is out of interest, which arises when the portfolio’s exposures are no
longer assumed to be homogeneously distributed or portfolio invariant, since it is this
risk that forms one of the basis for the additional capital requirement under Pillar 2.
The diﬃculty of directly identifying the unsystematic risk forces a computational detour,
where the distribution of total risk (W ) is calculated as a density function. The total
risk (W ) can be subtracted with the more easily calculated systematic risk (Y ) in order
to finally result in an approximation ot the unsystematic risk (Z).
To make the previous calculations understandable the terms denotes:
Ln = total risk, W
µ(x) = systematic risk, Y
Ln  µ(x) = unsystematic risk, Z.
When adding two variables, each with a density function, it requires their respective
density function to be convolved to result in the dependent variable density function. If
the are dependent on each other it is done in accordance with Appendix B.2. The joint
probability density function fW (w) is formed as follows:
fW (w) =
Z 1
 1
fY (w   z)fZ(z|w   z)dz. (15)
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Applying a Taylor-series expansion, as explained in Appendix B.11, of f(w   z) around
w gives
fY (w   z)fZ(z|w   z) =
1X
i=0
1
i!

di
dwi
fY (w)fZ(z|w)
 
((w   z)  w)i, (16)
which with the first term of the sum explicitly written can be expressed as
= fY (w)fZ(z|w) +
1X
i=1
( 1)i
i!

di
dwi
fY (w)fZ(z|w)
 
zi. (17)
Inserting Equation 17 in Equation 15 and applying Fubini’s theorem, see Appendix B.4,
gives
fW (w) =
Z 1
 1
fY (w)fZ(z|w)dz +
1X
i=1
( 1)i
i!
di
dwi
Z 1
 1
fY (w)fZ(z|w)zidz
 
. (18)
Let mi(w) denote the ith moment of Z conditional on Y = w, i.e.,
mi(w) = E[Z
i|Y = w] =
Z 1
 1
zifZ(z|w)dz. (19)
Substitute Z 1
 1
fY (w)fZ(z|w)zidz = fY (w)
Z 1
1
fZ(z|w)zidz = fY (w)mi(w) (20)
and Z 1
 1
fY (w)fZ(z|w)dz = fY (w) (21)
into Equation 18, along with the definition of mi(w) result in the following:
fW (w) = fY (w) +
1X
i=1
( 1)i
i!
di
dwi
[fY (w)mi(w)] , (22)
which can be written according to:
fY (w) = fW (w) 
1X
i=1
( 1)i
i!
di
dwi
[fY (w)mi(w)] . (23)
Equation 21 can be expressed that way since integrating over a probability density func-
tion results in 1 and f(w) does not depend on the integrating factor z. Definition of the
quantiles yields the following:Z ↵q(Y )
 1
fY (w)dw =
Z ↵q(Y+Z)
 1
fW (w)dw (24)
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and Z ↵q(Y+Z)
↵q(Y )
fY (w)dw =
Z ↵q(Y+Z)
 1
fY (w)dw  
Z ↵q(Y )
 1
fY (w)dw. (25)
Inserting Equation 23 in the second term in the LHS in Equation 25 gives:Z ↵q(Y+Z)
↵q(Y )
fY (w)dw =
Z ↵q(Y+Z)
 1
⇣
fW (w)+
1X
i=1
( 1)i
i!
di
dwi
[fY (w)mi(w)]
⌘
dw 
Z ↵q(Y )
 1
fY (w)dw.
(26)
First and third term in the RHS cancel each other out according to Equation 24, which
means thatZ ↵q(Y+Z)
↵q(Y )
fY (w)dw =
Z ↵q(Y+Z)
 1
1X
i=1
( 1)i
i!
di
dwi
[fY (w)mi(w)] dw
=
1X
i=1
( 1)i
i!
di 1
dwi 1
[fY (w)mi(w)] dw
   
w=↵q(Y+Z)
(27)
An integral approximation and assumption that only the second order approximation of
the Taylor expansion is needed7 gives:
fY (↵q(Y )) · (↵q(Y + Z)  ↵q(Y )) ⇡ fY (w)m1(w)  1
2
d
dw
[fY (w)m2(w)]
    
w=↵q(Y
. (28)
Dividing the term on the left hand side gives
(↵q(Y + Z)  ↵q(Y )) ⇡ fY (w)m1(w)
fY (↵q(Y ))
  1
2fY (↵q(Y ))
d
dw
[fY (w)m2(w)]
    
w=↵q(Y )
. (29)
Replace Y with the asymptotic loss percentage of the portfolio µ(X) and Z with
Ln   µ(X). For all w = µ(x) it is known that
m1(w) = E[Z
1|Y = w] = E[Z|X = x] = E[Ln|X = x]  E[E[Ln|X = x]|X = x] = 0
(30)
m2(w) = E[Z
2|Y = w] = E[Z2|X = x] = [ see Appendix B.9, Equation 66]
= V [Ln|X = x] + E[Z|X = x]2 = V [Ln|X = x] =  2(x)
(31)
7The assumption that only the second order approximation is needed is due to that the first deriva-
tive in the Taylor expansion vanishes, since the idiosyncratic component conditional on the systematic
component E[L|X] vanishes. The second derivative in Taylor expansion is the Granularity Adjustment,
because it represents the additional fraction to the VaR due to the undiversified idiosyncratic compo-
nent.(Beivydas et al, 2009, p. 47)
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The first term in Equation 29 then has the value 0 and the Equation can be written as
↵q(Y + Z)  ↵q(Y ) ⇡   1
2fY (↵q(Y ))
d
dw
[fY (w)m2(w)] (32)
insertion of Y = µ(x) and Z = Ln   µ(x) gives:
↵q(Ln)  µ(↵q(X)) ⇡   1
2fY (µ(↵q(X)))
d
dµ(x)
[fY (µ(x))m2(µ(x))]
    
µ(x)=↵q(µ(X))
(33)
Using the relationship fY (w)dw = µ0(x)h(x)dx which corresponds to fY (µ(x)) = h(x),
then Equation 33 can then be written as
↵q(Ln)  µ(↵q(X)) ⇡   1
2h((↵q(X)))
d
dx

h(x) 2(x)
µ0(x)
       
x=↵q(X)
⌘ GA. (34)
Equation 34 then express the capital requirement for name concentration risk, as a share
of the total portfolio EAD.
A.2 Granularity Adjustment Assigned for Basel
µ(x),  2(x) och h(x) are model dependent parameters. To be consistent with models
that form the basis for credit capital requirement under Pillar 1, the share of loss for the
exposure is defined as Ui = LGDi ·Di. Where Di is an default event indicator which takes
the values 1 or 0 with respect to whether the exposure defaults or not. The systematic
risk factor X generates correlation between borrowers defaults, since an increase in X
causes a shift in the default probabilities for all borrowers. This is due to the assumption
that µ(x) is strictly increasing when x is increasing. Given the systematic risk factor,
events of default are independent and occurs with probability
⇡i(x) = PDi · (1 + wi(x  1)) (35)
where PDi is the unconditional probability that borrowers i defaults. To control the
sensitivity of borrower i to the systematic risk factor a wi is defined. Assume that the
systematic risk factor X is gamma distributed with E[X] = 1 and V [X] = 1✏ where ✏ > 0
is a precision parameter. This leads to that allDi are conditionally independent Bernoulli
random variables with the conditional probability of defaulting Pr(Di = 1|X = x) =
⇡i(x). If the Di on the other hand are unconditionally they are dependent Bernoulli
random variables. The probability of default for unconditionally Bernoulli variables
consists solely of PDi, i.e. Pr(Di = 1) = PDi. To achieve an analytical solution of the
model, Credit Risk +, which is used in the formula for credit risk, it is assumed that
the distribution of Di is Poisson distributed. Assuming that a Bernoulli default event
is Poisson distributed is critical to achieve analytical tractability. Approximation error
that occurs is proportional to PD2 which means that it is small when most borrowers
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have low PD. To fit the model assumptions under Pillar 1 this extended Credit Risk+
method allows LGDi to be a random loss given default with expected value E[LGDi]
and variance V [LGDi] in comparison with Credit Risk+ (not extended model) which
assumes that LGDi is known. The uncertainty of LGDi is assumed to be idiosyncratic
and thus independent of the risk factor X. According to scholars this assumption may be
somewhat limiting but are retained to be consistent with the model assumptions for the
formula for credit risk under Pillar 1 and for ease of handling. Starts to develop µ(x) and
 2(x) for the model. Define functions µi(x) = E[Ui|X = x] and  2i (x) = V [Ui|X = x].
By the assumption of conditional independence it is given:
µ(x) = E[Ln|X = x] =
nX
i=1
siµi(x) 
2(x) = V [Ln|X = x] =
nX
i=1
s2i 
2
i (x) (36)
Lenders conditional expected loss function is
µi(x) = E[LGDi] · ⇡i(x),
and the conditional variance of loss is
 2i = E[LGD
2
i ·D2i |X = x] E[LGDi]2 ·⇡i(x)2 = E[LGD2i ] ·E[D2i |X = x] µi(x)2 (37)
As Di given X in Credit Risk+ model is assumed to be Poisson distributed is E[D2i |X =
x] = V [Di|X = x] = ⇡i(x), see Appendix B.10, which means
E[D2i |X = x] = ⇡i(x) + ⇡i(x)2 (38)
The term E[LGD2i ] can be expressed as
E[LGD2i ] = V [LGDi] + E[LGDi]
2 (39)
and be replaced in Equation 37 leading to
 2i (x) = (V [LGDi] + E[LGDi]
2) · (⇡i(x) + ⇡i(x)2)  µi(x)2
=
V [LGDi] + E[LGDi]2
E[LGDi]
µi(x) + µi(x)
2 · V [LGDi]
E[LGDi]2
(40)
where
Ci =
V [LGDi] + E[LGDi]2
E[LGDi]
(41)
assigned for simplification of the expression, leading to
 2i (x) = (V [LGDi]+E[LGDi]
2) ·(⇡i(x)+⇡i(x)2) µi(x)2 = Ciµi(x)+µi(x)2 · V [LGDi]
E[LGDi]2
(42)
Insertion of the expressions for µ(x) and  2(x) in Equation 34 and evaluating the deriva-
tive at x = ↵q(X) results in
GA =   1
2
Pn
i=1 siµ
0
i(↵q(X))
h0(↵q(X))
h(↵q(X))
·
nX
i=1
s2i⇥
✓
Ciµi(↵q(X)) + µ
2
i (↵q(X))
V [LGDi]
E[LGDi]2
◆
  1
2
Pn
i=1 siµ
0
i(↵q(X))
·
nX
i=1
s2iµ
0
i(↵q(X))⇥
✓
Ci + 2µi(↵q(X))
V [LGDi]
E[LGDi]2
◆
(43)
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Reparameterisation of the input data by allowing Ri be the capital requirements for
credit losses as a percentage of EAD for borrowers i. Within the model, Credit Risk+,
this means
Ri = E[Ui] = E[LGDi] · PDi (44)
Let Ki be asymptotically capital requirement for unexpected loss, UL, as a percentage
of EAD.
Ki = E[Ui|X = ↵q(X)]  E[Ui] = E[LGDi] · PDi · wi · (↵q(X)  1) (45)
At portfolio level, weighted average R and weighted average K is defined analogously to
capital requirements for credit losses and capital requirements for each unit of exposure
as a percentage of EAD for the portfolio as a whole, namely:
R =
nX
i=1
siRi och K =
nX
i=1
siKi (46)
After inserting R and K in the formula for GA at Credit Risk+ model it can be seen
that PDi and wi can be eliminated, which means the following formula
GA =
1
2K
nX
i=1
s2i
"✓
 Ci(Ki +Ri) +  (Ki +Ri)
2 · V [LGDi]
E[LGDi]2
◆
 Ki
✓
Ci + 2(Ki +Ri) · V [LGDi]
E[LGDi]2
◆# (47)
where
  =  h
0(x)
h(x)
(↵q(X)  1) = (↵q(X)  1) ·
✓
✏+
1  ✏
↵q(X)
◆
(48)
The formula for GA can be simplified when Ri and Ki are small and the products of
these quantities can be expected to contribute very little to the GA. If these second-order
terms are dropped the simplified expression is achieved:
gGA = 1
2K
nX
i=1
s2iCi( (Ki +Ri) Ki) (49)
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B Appendix
This chapter explains mathematical conditions such as distributions and convolution.
These terms and explanations are placed in alphabetical order.
B.1 Capital Adequacy Requirement and CAR
Capital adequacy requirements implies a certain level of equity in relation to risk-weighted
assets. This level is defined by a ratio, which is called Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR).
The Capital Adequacy Ratio is defined as regulatory capital as a percentage of a bank’s
risky assets (BCBS, 2006, p. 12). The ratio is expressed as
CAR =
(Tier1+ Tier2)
RWA
. (50)
Note that parts of a firms equity can be divided into Tier1 and Tier2 capital according
to its liquidity. Tier1 capital is regarded as the most liquid, i.e. easily converted into
cash. (Hull, 2012, p. 289-290)
B.2 Convolution
A mathematical operation on two functions f and g, producing a third function that is
typically viewed as a modified version of one of the original functions, giving the area
overlap between the two functions as a function of the amount that one of the original
functions is translated. Let f(t) and g(t) be functions defined on . The convolution
f ⇤ g of f and g is defined as the integral of the product of the two functions after one is
reversed and shifted. As such, it is a particular type of integral transform:
(fg)(t) =
Z 1
 1
f(⌧)g(t  ⌧)d⌧ (51)
(Spanne & Sparr, 1996, p. 69)
B.3 Factorial
In mathematics, the factorial of a non-negative integer k, denoted by k!, is the product
of all positive integers less than or equal to k. For example, 4! = 4 ⇥ 3 ⇥ 2 ⇥ 1 = 24.
(Persson & Böiers, 2009, p. 59)
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B.4 Fubini’s Theorem
If the function f(x, y) is XY integrable, meaning that it is measurable andZ
X⇥Y
|f(x, y)| d(x, y) <1, (52)
then Z
X
✓Z
Y
f(x, y)dy
◆
dx =
Z
Y
✓Z
X
f(x, y)dx
◆
dy (53)
(Shiryaev, 1989, p. 198) Note that a summation is a special case of integrating and
therefore Fubini’s theorem is used in the derivation of Granularity adjustment according
to: Z
X
 X
Y
f(x, y)dy
!
dx =
X
Y
✓Z
X
f(x, y)dx
◆
dy. (54)
B.5 Gamma Distribution
The probability density function of a random variable X that is Gamma-distributed can
be written as
fX(x) =
8<:
 n
 (n)
· xc 1e  x if x > 0
0 if x  0
(55)
where  (n) is the gamma-function evaluated at n, with n > 0 and   > 0. (Blom, 2005,
p. 64)
B.6 Gamma-function
The Gamma function is defined as
 (n) =
Z 1
0
xn 1e xdx where n > 0. (56)
If n is a positive integer, then the function is an extension of the factorial function. That
is,
 (n) = (n  1)! (57)
(Blom, 2005, p. 64).
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B.7 Herfindahl Index or HI
(Also know as Herfindahl–Hirschman Index, or HHI. )
HI =
nX
i=1
 2i (58)
where
 i =
EADiPn
i=1EADi
. (59)
(U.S. Department of Justice, 2014)
B.8 Normal Distribution
A random variable X that is normally distributed is denoted by
X ⇠ N(µ, 2) (60)
and have the probability density function
f(x, µ, ) =
1
 
p
2⇡
e 
(x µ)2
2 2 (61)
where the parameter µ is the mean or expectation of the distribution. The parameter  
is its standard deviation; its variance is therefore  2. If µ = 0 and   = 1, the distribution
is called the Standard Normal Distribution or the Unit Normal Distribution.(Blom, 2005,
p. 62)
B.9 Moment
If f is a probability density function, then the value of E[(X   a)n] is called the n:th
moment around the value a of the probability distribution. (Blom, 1984, p. 129)
B.10 Poisson Distribution
A discrete probability distribution that expresses the probability of a given number of
events occurring in a fixed interval of time and/or space. These events occur with a
known average intensity and independently of the time since the last event. Let N(t) be
the number of events taking place in the time interval [0; t]. If N(t) is a Poisson process
with constant intensity  , then N(t) 2 Po( t).
Time lags between consecutive events are independent and exponentially distributed
with expectation 1/ .
74
The number of events occurring in a time intervall I1 and the number of events oc-
curring in another time interval I2 are independent if I1 and I2 are disjoint. A Poisson
process Po( ) has the probability mass function
pX(k) =
 k
k!
· e  , k = 0, 1, 2, ... and   > 0. (62)
The positive real number   is equal to the expected value of X and also to its variance
  = E[X] = V [X]. (Blom, 2005, p. 180-182)
B.11 Taylor Expansion
Taylor expansion is a method to approximate a function f(x) with an interval covering
a fixed point a. The approximation of the function is a polynomial of the argument for
the function, which in this case corresponds to x. Assume that the function f and its
derivatives to the order n + 1 are continuous in a neighborhood of a. Then, for all x in
this environment can a Taylor expansion of order n be written as
f(x) ⇡ f(a) + f
0(a)
1!
(x  a) + f
00(a)
2!
(x  a)2 + · · · + f
(n)(a)
n!
(x  a)n (63)
where n is a positive integer. (Persson & Böiers, 2009, p. 411)
B.12 Value at Risk (VaR)
Value at Risk is a risk measure that states where the loss probability density function
with a certain probability and given time period exceeds the value VaR. Mathematically,
if L is the loss of a portfolio, then V aR↵(L) is the level ↵-quantile, i.e.
P (L > VaR↵) = 1  ↵ (64)
VaR↵(L) = inf{l 2 R : P (L > l)  1  ↵} = inf{l 2 R : FL(l)   ↵}. (65)
(Hull, 2012, p. 183-185)
B.13 Variance
One definition of variance used in derivation of Granularity adjustment:
V (x) = E
⇥
(X   E(X))2⇤ = E(x2)  [E(x)]2 (66)
(Blom, 2005, p. 117)
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C Appendix
The focus in this Appendix will be placed on presenting the altering implications of Basel
III that have an indirect aﬀect on credit concentration risk.
C.1 Altering Implications of Basel III
Purely computationally, there is only one minor alteration to the risk-weight formulas
under Pillar 1, where exposures to large financial institutions are assumed to have a
higher correlation with the portfolio (BCBS, 2011, p. 39 §102). This will aﬀect the capi-
tal adequacy requirement under Pillar 1, which indirectly will aﬀect the capital adequacy
requirement under Pillar 2 including credit concentration risk.
Furthermore, Basel III implies an increased quantity of the regulatory capital, as a con-
sequence of three new additional capital buﬀers during periods outside of stress (BCBS,
2011, p. 6). They are implemented so that breaches of minimum capital requirements
shall be avoided (BCBS, 2011, p. 54), and they will be phased in until 2019 (KPMG,
2013, p. 3). The result will be that in 2019, the buﬀers of totally 5% are added to the
minimum total capital requirement for risk during periods outside of stress. Thus, banks
will then need a capital ratio of at least 13% under Pillar 1. Note that when entering a
tougher period, the buﬀers will be decreased or completely removed, i.e. the minimum
total capital requirement will then remain at 8%. (KPMG, 2013, p. 3) The Pillar 2 add-
on for credit concentration risk still needs to be considered, i.e. it remain as a separate
requirement over and above the new capital buﬀers (KPMG, 2013, p. 3). The increase
of the capital adequacy requirement under Pillar 1 will indirectly aﬀect the capital ade-
quacy requirement under Pillar 2, including credit concentration risk (BCBS, 2011, p. 69).
An additional alteration is that Basel III implies an increased quality of the regulatory
capital, increasing the proportion of Tier 1 capital out of the regulatory capital (KPMG,
2013, p. 3). The same ratio will apply for the capital requirement resulting from the
Pillar 2 add-ons, including the add-on for credit concentration risk. To conclude, banks
consequently have been forced to redesign parts of their ICAAP and this redesign will
continue during the upcoming years in order to account for the new levels of regulatory
requirements. (KPMG, 2013, p. 3)
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D Appendix Matlab Code
1 %I l l u s t r a t i n g example p o r t f o l i o s
2 %R = [N HI AHI Sch GA PDwa ADP]
3 format long
4 N = 10000 ;
5 a = 0 . 0 0 1 ;
6 EAD = ze ro s (N, 1 ) ;
7 PD = ze ro s (N, 1 ) ;
8 LGD = 0.45∗ ones (N, 1 ) ;
9 M = 2.5∗ ones (N, 1 ) ;
10 R = ones (5 , 7 ) ;
11
12 %P1 Reference Po r t f o l i o
13 EAD( : , 1 ) = 1/N;
14 PD( : , 1 ) = a ;
15 p o r t f o l i o = [EAD PD LGD M] ;
16 R( 1 , : ) = GAall ( p o r t f o l i o ) ;
17 % P2
18 EAD = ze ro s (N, 1 ) ;
19 EAD(1) = 0 . 1 0 ;
20 EAD(2) = 0 . 0 9 ;
21 EAD(3) = 0 . 0 8 ;
22 EAD(4 : end ) = (1  EAD(1) EAD(2) EAD(3) ) /(N 3) ;
23 PD( : , 1 ) = a ;
24 p o r t f o l i o = [EAD PD LGD M] ;
25 R( 2 , : ) = GAall ( p o r t f o l i o ) ;
26 % P3
27 EAD = ze ro s (N, 1 ) ;
28 EAD(1) = 0 . 0 5 ;
29 EAD(2) = 0 . 0 4 ;
30 EAD(3) = 0 . 0 3 ;
31 EAD(4 : end ) = (1  EAD(1) EAD(2) EAD(3) ) /(N 3) ;
32 PD( : , 1 ) = a ;
33 p o r t f o l i o = [EAD PD LGD M] ;
34 R( 3 , : ) = GAall ( p o r t f o l i o ) ;
35 % P4
36 EAD = ze ro s (N, 1 ) ;
37 f o r i =1:30
38 EAD( i ) = 0.03 0.001∗( i  1) ;
39 end
40 b = sum(EAD(1 : 3 0 ) ) ;
41 EAD(31 : end ) = (1  b) /(N 30) ;
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42 PD( : , 1 ) = a ;
43 p o r t f o l i o = [EAD PD LGD M] ;
44 R( 4 , : ) = GAall ( p o r t f o l i o ) ;
45
46 % P5
47 EAD = ze ro s (N, 1 ) ;
48 f o r i =1:30
49 EAD( i ) = 0.015 0.0005∗( i  1) ;
50 end
51 b = sum(EAD(1 : 3 0 ) ) ;
52 EAD(31 : end ) = (1  b) /(N 30) ;
53 PD( : , 1 ) = a ;
54 p o r t f o l i o = [EAD PD LGD M] ;
55 R( 5 , : ) = GAall ( p o r t f o l i o ) ;
56
57 %Plot , axes (HI ,PD∗ , CapitalReq )
58 f i g u r e
59 HI = R( : , 2 ) ;
60 Sch = R( : , 4 ) ;
61 GA = R( : , 5 ) ;
62 PDwa = R( : , 6 ) ;
63 p lo t3 (HI ,PDwa, Sch , ’ bo ’ , ’ MarkerSize ’ , 6 , ’ LineWidth ’ , 2 )
64 hold on
65 p lo t3 (HI ,PDwa,GA, ’ rx ’ , ’ MarkerSize ’ , 6 , ’ LineWidth ’ , 2 )
66 hold on
67 x l ab e l ( ’HI ’ )
68 y l ab e l ( ’PD’ )
69 z l a b e l ( ’ Capi ta l requirement ’ )
70
71 %Plot , axes (AHI ,APD∗ , CapitalReq )
72 f i g u r e
73 AHI = R( : , 3 ) ;
74 Sch = R( : , 4 ) ;
75 GA = R( : , 5 ) ;
76 APD = R( : , 7 ) ;
77 p lo t3 (AHI ,APD, Sch , ’ bo ’ , ’ MarkerSize ’ , 6 , ’ LineWidth ’ , 2 )
78 hold on
79 p lo t3 (AHI ,APD,GA, ’ rx ’ , ’ MarkerSize ’ , 6 , ’ LineWidth ’ , 2 )
80 hold on
81 x l ab e l ( ’AHI ’ )
82 y l ab e l ( ’APD’ )
83 z l a b e l ( ’ Capi ta l Requirement ’ )
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1 % Main
2 N = 1000 ;
3 a = 1 ;
4 P = ze ro s (N∗0 .2∗N∗a , 4 ) ;
5 R = ze ro s (N∗0 .2∗ a , 8 ) ;
6
7 f o r n =1:a
8 [ EADvariations , PDvariat ions ] = varyEADandPD(N) ;
9 nbrOfPortfol iosEAD = s i z e ( EADvariations , 2 ) ;
10 LGD = 0.45∗ ones (N, 1 ) ;
11 M = 2.5∗ ones (N, 1 ) ;
12 f o r i = 1 : nbrOfPortfol iosEAD
13 EAD = EADvariations ( : , i ) ;
14 PD = PDvariat ions ( : , i ) ;
15 p o r t f o l i o = [EAD PD LGD M] ;
16 P(N∗( i  1)+1+N∗nbrOfPortfol iosEAD ∗(n 1) :N∗( i  1)+N+N∗
nbrOfPortfol iosEAD ∗(n 1) , : ) = p o r t f o l i o ;
17 va lue s = GAall ( p o r t f o l i o ) ;
18 po r t f o l i o nb r = i+(n 1)∗ i ;
19 R( i + nbrOfPortfol iosEAD ∗(n 1) , : ) = [ p o r t f o l i o nb r
va lue s ] ;
20 end
21 end
22
23 %% Comparison , axes (HI ,PD, CapitalReq )
24 %c l o s e a l l
25 f i g u r e
26 HI = R( : , 3 ) ;
27 Sch = R( : , 5 ) ;
28 GA = R( : , 6 ) ;
29 PDwa = R( : , 7 ) ;
30
31 p lo t3 (HI ,PDwa, Sch , ’b . ’ )
32 hold on
33 p lo t3 (HI ,PDwa,GA, ’ rx ’ )
34 hold on
35
36 x l ab e l ( ’HI ’ )
37 y l ab e l ( ’PD’ )
38 z l a b e l ( ’ Capi ta l Requirement ’ )
39
40 %% Comparison , axes (AHI ,APD, CapitalReq )
41 %c l o s e a l l
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42 f i g u r e
43 AHI = R( : , 4 ) ;
44 Sch = R( : , 5 ) ;
45 GA = R( : , 6 ) ;
46 APD = R( : , 8 ) ;
47
48 p lo t3 (AHI ,APD, Sch , ’b . ’ )
49 hold on
50 p lo t3 (AHI ,APD,GA, ’ rx ’ )
51 hold on
52
53 x l ab e l ( ’AHI ’ )
54 y l ab e l ( ’APD’ )
55 z l a b e l ( ’ Capi ta l Requirement ’ )
56
57 %% Di f f e r ence , axes (HI ,PD, diffSchGA )
58 f i g u r e
59 HI = R( : , 3 ) ;
60 Sch = R( : , 5 ) ;
61 GA = R( : , 6 ) ;
62 Di f f = GA Sch ;
63 PDwa = R( : , 7 ) ;
64
65 p lo t3 (HI ,PDwa, Di f f , ’ b . ’ )
66
67 x l ab e l ( ’HI ’ )
68 y l ab e l ( ’PD’ )
69 z l a b e l ( ’ D i f f e r e n c e ’ )
70
71 %% Di f f e r ence , axes (AHI ,APD, diffSchGA )
72 f i g u r e
73 AHI = R( : , 4 ) ;
74 Sch = R( : , 5 ) ;
75 GA = R( : , 6 ) ;
76 Di f f = GA Sch ;
77 APD = R( : , 8 ) ;
78
79 p lo t3 (AHI ,APD, Di f f , ’ b . ’ )
80
81 x l ab e l ( ’AHI ’ )
82 y l ab e l ( ’APD’ )
83 z l a b e l ( ’ D i f f e r e n c e ’ )
84
80
85
86 %% Inc lud ing Ikanos p o r t f o l i o
87 HI=0.00258747707;
88 PDwa=0.00376658546;
89 AHI=0.01313221251;
90 APD=0.00194561928;
91 Sch=0.000688737724;
92 GA=0.002265134719;
93 Di f f = GA Sch ;
94
95 %%
96 p lo t3 (HI ,PDwa, Sch , ’ go ’ , ’ MarkerSize ’ , 6 , ’ LineWidth ’ , 2 )
97 hold on
98 p lo t3 (HI ,PDwa,GA, ’ g+’ , ’ MarkerSize ’ , 6 , ’ LineWidth ’ , 2 )
99 hold on
100 %%
101 p lo t3 (AHI ,APD, Sch , ’ go ’ , ’ MarkerSize ’ , 6 , ’ LineWidth ’ , 2 )
102 hold on
103 p lo t3 (AHI ,APD,GA, ’ g+’ , ’ MarkerSize ’ , 6 , ’ LineWidth ’ , 2 )
104 hold on
105
106 %%
107 p lo t3 (HI ,PDwa, Di f f , ’ go ’ , ’ MarkerSize ’ , 6 , ’ LineWidth ’ , 2 )
108
109 %%
110 p lo t3 (AHI ,APD, Di f f , ’ go ’ , ’ MarkerSize ’ , 6 , ’ LineWidth ’ , 2 )
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1 f unc t i on [ EADvariations , PDvariat ions ] = varyEADandPD(N)
2 EAD = ze ro s (N, 1 ) ;
3 PD = ze ro s (N, 1 ) ;
4 nbrOfBigExposures = 0.20∗N;
5 EADvariations = ze ro s (N, nbrOfBigExposures ) ;
6 PDvariat ions = ze ro s (N, nbrOfBigExposures ) ;
7
8 f o r i = 1 : nbrOfBigExposures
9 i f i <6
10 EAD(1 : i ) = 0 .01 + 0.06∗ rand ( i , 1 ) ; %a s s i g n e s va lues
in the i n t e r v a l [ 0 . 0 1   0 . 0 7 ]
11 PD(1 : i ) = 0 + 0.0001∗ rand ( i , 1 ) ; %a s s i g n e s va lue s in
the i n t e r v a l [ 0   0 . 0 001 ]
12 e l s e i f 5< i && i <0.2∗N
13 a = 0.3/ i ;
14 avv i k e l s e = a /2 ;
15 EAD(1 : i ) = a avv i k e l s e + 2∗ avv i k e l s e ∗ rand ( i , 1 ) ;
16 PD(1 : i ) = 0 + 0.001∗ rand ( i , 1 ) ; %a s s i g n e s va lues in
the i n t e r v a l [ 0   0 . 0 0 1 ]
17 end
18 b = 1 sum(EAD(1 : i ) ) ; % remaining share the other
exposures w i l l share
19 b = b/(N i ) ; % approximately how much each remaining
exposure should be as s i gned
20 l = 1/(N∗10) ; %how much the remaining exposures can
dev ia t e from the est imated value the should be
as s i gned
21 k = 0.1∗N; %how many exposures that c o r r e c t s in the end
22 EAD( i +1:end k ) = (b l )+l ∗2∗ rand (N i k , 1 ) ;
23 EAD( end (k 1) : end ) = (1 sum(EAD(1 : end k ) ) ) /k ;
24 EADvariations ( : , i ) = EAD;
25
26 PD( i +1:0.5∗N) = 0 + 0.002∗ rand (0 . 5∗N i , 1 ) ;
27 PD(0 . 5∗N+1:0.85∗N) = 0.002 +0.018.∗ rand (0 . 35∗N, 1 ) ;
28 PD(0 .85∗N+1:0.9∗N) = 0.035 + 0 . 0 1 . ∗ rand (0 . 05∗N, 1 ) ;
29 PD(0 . 9∗N+1:end ) = 0 + 0 . 001 .∗ rand (0 . 10∗N, 1 ) ;
30 PDvariat ions ( : , i ) = PD;
31 end
32 end
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1 f unc t i on [ va lue s ] = GAall ( p o r t f o l i o )
2 %po r t f o l i o in the form [EAD PD LGD M]
3 EAD = po r t f o l i o ( : , 1 ) ;
4 PD = po r t f o l i o ( : , 2 ) ;
5 LGD = po r t f o l i o ( : , 3 ) ;
6 M = po r t f o l i o ( : , 4 ) ;
7
8 N = length (PD) ;
9 s = ze ro s (N, 1 ) ;
10 VLGD = ze ro s (N, 1 ) ;
11 C = ze ro s (N, 1 ) ;
12 Corr = ze ro s (N, 1 ) ;
13 b = ze ro s (N, 1 ) ;
14 R = ze ro s (N, 1 ) ;
15 K = ze ro s (N, 1 ) ;
16 de l t a = 4 . 8 3 ;
17 gamma = 0 . 2 5 ;
18
19 f o r i =1:N
20 s ( i ) = EAD( i ) . / sum(EAD) ;
21 VLGD( i ) = gamma∗LGD( i )∗(1 LGD( i ) ) ;
22 C( i ) = (VLGD( i )+LGD( i ) ^2)/LGD( i ) ;
23 Corr ( i ) = 0.12∗(1  exp( 50∗PD( i ) ) ) /(1 exp( 50) )+0.24∗(1 (1 exp
( 50∗PD( i ) ) ) /(1 exp( 50) ) ) ;
24 b( i ) = (0.11852 0.05478∗ l og (PD( i ) ) ) ^2;
25 R( i ) = LGD( i ) ∗PD( i ) ;
26 K( i ) = (LGD( i ) ∗normcdf (1/ sq r t (1 Corr ( i ) ) ∗norminv (PD( i ) )+(Corr ( i )
/(1 Corr ( i ) ) ) ^0.5∗ norminv (0 . 9 99 ) ) PD( i ) ∗LGD( i ) ) ∗(1+(M( i )
 2.5)∗b( i ) ) /(1 1.5∗b( i ) ) ;
27 i f K( i )<0
28 K( i ) = 0 ;
29 end
30 i f i snan (K( i ) ) == 1
31 K( i ) = 0 ;
32 end
33 end
34
35 Kstar=sum( s .∗K) ;
36 GAall=1/(2∗(Kstar ) ) ∗sum( s .^2 .∗C. ∗ ( d e l t a ∗(K+R) K) ) ;
37
38 % Standard i sed Approach
39 % Sort out the 30 b i gg e s t exposures
40 k = 30 ;
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41 c = [EAD PD] ;
42 temp = sort rows ( c , 1 ) ;
43 temp = f l i pd im ( temp , 1 ) ;
44 EADbiggest = temp ( 1 : k , 1 ) ;
45 PDbiggest = temp ( 1 : k , 2 ) ;
46
47 % Calcu la te AHI f o r the p o r t f o l i o
48 sigma30 = EADbiggest . / sum(EADbiggest ) ;
49 HI30 = sum( sigma30 .^2) ;
50 AHI = HI30 ∗(sum(EADbiggest ) ) /(sum(EAD) ) ;
51
52 % Calcu la te APD f o r the p o r t f o l i o
53 APD = sum( sigma30 .∗ PDbiggest ) ;
54
55 % Ass ign ing cor re spond ing share based on the value o f AHI
56 i f AHI <0.01
57 Schablon = 0 ;
58 end
59 i f AHI >=0.01 && AHI<0.02
60 Schablon = 0 . 0 2 ;
61 end
62 i f AHI >=0.02 && AHI<0.04
63 Schablon = 0 . 0 4 ;
64 end
65 i f AHI >=0.04 && AHI<0.08
66 Schablon = 0 . 0 6 ;
67 end
68 i f AHI >=0.08
69 Schablon = 0 . 0 8 ;
70 end
71 sigma = EAD./ sum(EAD) ;
72 HI = sum( sigma .^2) ;
73 Schablon = Schablon∗Kstar ;
74 PDwa = sum( s .∗PD) ;
75 va lue s = [N, HI , AHI , Schablon , GAall , PDwa, APD] ;
76 end
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